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The Swiss Cheese Policy: 
The Return of Russia to the Middle East, 
a Revival or Downfall? 
 
Carel Claude El-Hayek 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
The Middle East is currently witnessing the return of the Russian Federation as a major 
power after years of decline. Russia today has done a great comeback regionally and 
internationally. It has played a great role in the Syrian and Iranian Crisis, with a firm 
position opposing the international community in the two. Russia has achieved its 
major goal of regaining a strong position as a powerful player in the Middle East 
making use of its best tools Syria and Iran. This thesis will try to answer the following 
research questions: What factors allowed the Russian influence revival in the Middle 
East? Why does it want to support Iran and Syria in opposition to the international 
community? 
The first argument proposed will highlight the aim behind the Russian-Iranian 
and Russian- Syrian support, not only for the sake of economic benefits, but also for 
two major reasons. The first is to regain its powerful role on the international level, and 
second, to restore its influence in the Middle East, which constitutes a major strategic 
interest for Russia.  The second argument proposed will identify the three main factors 
Russia made use of in order to comeback as a strong power and firmly stand against the 
international community. First, the improved domestic factors within the Russian 
federation, second, the declined influence of the United States in the international world 
order, and third, is the change in the political orders of the Middle East. Those factors 
gave way for Russia to revive its influence in the Middle Eastern and international 
arena. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Russia, Iran, Syria, Middle East, Revival, Influence,  
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter                                                                                                                      Page 
 
I- Introduction to Revolutions ..................................................................................1 
1.1 Research Question and Topic importance ………………………………………1 
1.2 Importance and objective  …………………………………………………………..1 
1.3 Thesis Argument ……………………………………………………………….2 
1.4 Theory application of the Neo-Realist  
      Approach to the Russian Middle Eastern Foreign Policy………………………….3 
1.5 Methodology and Research Design  ………………………………………………7 
1.6 Literature Review    ………………………………………………………………7 
1.7 Preview on the Chapters .………………………………………………………….. 9 
 
II- Importance of the Middle East to Russia ……………………………………….12 
2.1 Proximity Importance   ……………………………………………………………12 
2.2 Historical Review of Russia’s Influence in the  
      Middle East – Iran and Syria in Focus ...…..………………………………………13 
2.2.1 Before the Cold War Era   ……………………………………………………….14 
2.2.2 During the Cold War Era – Until 1991   ………………………………………...16 
2.2.3 From 1990 Reaching the Putin Era ……………………………………………...24 
2.2.4 Putin in Power ………………………………………………………………….. 26 
 
III- Factors of Russian Comeback ..……..…………………………………………..29 
3.1 Local- Stronger Domestic Russia  ………………………………………………29 
3.2 Changed Middle Eastern Order ...………………………………………………31 
3.3 International - Weakened U.S. and International Order  ………………………32 
3.4 The Ukrainian Factor .………………………………….…………………….……34 
 
IV- Particularities of Russian- Iranian Interest ……………………………………36 
4.1 Nuclear Iran a Threat to Russia ……………………………………………….37 
4.1.1 Russian Stance vs. the International Position ……………………………….38 
4.2 Why this Support? ………………………………………………………………....42 
4.2.1Bordering Conflict Concern - Chechen Conflict …………………………43 
4.2.2 A Stitched Economy- Arms Sales and Oil.………………………………….44 
4.2.3 Iran as a Pressure Tool Against the U.S. and its Actions ……………………….48 
 
V- Particularities of the Russian- Syrian Interest    ……......................................... 52 
5.1 The On-going Syrian Uprising …………………………………………………….52 
 
5.1.1 Russian Stance vs. the International Position …………………………………54 
5.1.2 Decisive Russian Diplomacy- Syrian Chemical Weapons ……………………...56 
 
 
ix 
 
5.2 Why this Support? ………………………………………………………………... 58 
5.2.1 Arms Sales, Military and Economic Cooperation …………………………….58 
5.2.2 Syria a Business Partner Today ……………………………………………..64 
5.2.3 Energy .……..………………………………………………………………... 65 
5.2.4 Fear of Islamic Regimes ………………………………………………………66 
5.2.5 The Israeli Factor ………………………………………………………………..68 
5.3 Promoting a Strong Russia …………………………..…………………….………71 
 
VI- Conclusion ..…………………………………………………..…………………..73 
 
References……………………………………………………………………………..78
                                                                                                           
 
1 
 
Chapter One  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Question and Topic Importance 
 
Throughout the 21
st
 century and more specifically during the writing of this thesis, the 
Middle East faces various significant strategic challenges, which would undoubtedly affect the 
future of several countries throughout the world. Heavily influenced by economic, political, 
and geopolitical factors, the general security and global welfare are shaken by extensive 
challenges. Some of the last include regime toppling, nuclear proliferation and expansion, 
humanitarian violations, and questionable international authority. One of these challenging 
events was the ability of Russia, the former Soviet Union, to return as a major player in the 
Middle East.  
1.2 Importance and objective 
The intriguing question this study will attempt to tackle will focus on the factors that 
allowed Russia to return as a major international actor, through its position from what was 
happening in Iran and Syria. Furthermore, it will argue that Russia’s ability to do so was made 
possible by the changes that had taken place in Russia, the Middle East, and the world. The 
thesis will allow the reader to have an over-all insight about how a former major power like 
Russia managed to revive its influence and position in the Middle East and the world after 
around two decades of a setback.  
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The Russian-Iranian and Russian-Syrian relationships inflict outcomes on international 
political, economic, and security levels. The cooperation or opposition in both fronts greatly 
influences the international system.Taking into account the historical relationship between 
Russia and both states, as well as the “dynamic interests” they constitute to international 
community, the Russian foreign policy requires calculations. Mindful that this region was a 
major arena during the Cold War events, it remains a challenging ground of interests for both 
powers; United States and Russia. Given the fact of this multi-polarity of the international 
system today, and the reality that the U.S.’s hegemonic times may be receding, discussions of 
emerging strong states are becoming prominent 
1.3 Thesis Argument  
The Soviet Union, prior to its disintegration, was a super power with the ability to 
project its influence throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the world at large. 
After the end of the Cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence in the 
world has faced a setback. It was unable to influence the course of events in the world. This 
remained so until the coming of President Vladimir Putin to power (Former KGB officer, 
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin previously served as Russian Prime Minister from 
1999 till 2000, elected served as President from 2000 to 2008, and again from 2008 to 2012. 
Putin was re-elected last on 4 March 2012). The thesis will investigate the factors that allowed 
Russia to regain its influence internationally and it will also argue that its support to Iran and 
Syria were very detrimental in its ability to do so. This was not the case between 1990 and 
early 2000s. Russia, after the Cold War until recent events, rarely opposed the international 
community regarding Middle Eastern affairs because it was unable to do so. However, with the 
Russian feeling that its distinct role is being belittled and unable to reenact the Soviet Union 
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model, Russia felt it was crucial and absolutely necessary to make use of the current events in 
the Middle East to regain its role as a major power. Russia’s best vehicle to achieve its current 
strategy was through the support of Iran and Syria against the international community’s 
wishes.  
This research considers the cooperation between Iran, Syria, and Russia as a strategic 
alliance, where the three countries were in need of each other. As Russia needed Iran and 
Syria, they were, as well, in need of the Russian support in their struggle of the international 
community. As Mark Katz describes the Russian-Iranian relation as a “strategic cooperation” 
in the Putin era, this thesis supports and also argues that Russian view towards Syria is the 
same. Consequently, any threat for Damascus and Tehran is considered to be a direct threat to 
Russia’s vital interests (Katz, 2002). 
To pressure the international community, precisely the US, to accept Moscow’s new 
revived role in the region and the world-wide, Putin’s decision to strengthen Russia’s 
cooperation with countries such as Iran and Syria, reflects a foreign policy driven by economic 
and security reasons. The Russian aim to face the U.S. presence in the region has been the 
historical Russian ambition to have a dominant role in the Middle East.   
Nevertheless, the two most important questions the thesis trying to answer are: why 
Russia is supporting Iran and Syria, and objecting the position of the international community 
towards them? What factors allowed Russia to be able to do so? The neorealist approach will 
provide a valid explanation for the Russian ability. 
1.4 Theory application of the Neo-Realist approach to the Russian-
Middle Eastern foreign policy  
   
 
4 
 
This Russian policy is strongly anchored in the neo-realist paradigm, where it focuses 
on its national interest, portraying a tough relationship with resources expansion, political 
targets, and strong fondness to international development of its own transnational companies 
such as Gazprom (Whitmore, 2009). The evolution of the Russian foreign policy initiated 
during the presidency of Vladimir Putin targeted to enhance economic measures, increased 
exports of oil and gas and European dependence on Russian supplies; this was aimed to reach a 
renewed hegemonic status, reflecting the state’s power and influence in the international arena. 
Power is understood here as the “motive force of the statecraft, the capacity to act in foreign 
affairs” (Puchala, 1971, p.176). 
According to Hopf (1999),markedly, Moscow is consciously attempting to ‘fine-tune’ 
its contemporary foreign policy tools. Notably, from the neorealist perspective, actors that do 
not perceive relations as competitive are severely punished for their idealism. Hence, Russia’s 
choice of its present policy fully transformed it into a hard-hitting assertive actor, which 
triggered a positive outcome; it allowed it to face the structural pressures in the international 
arena (Hopf, 1999). 
This paper believes that neorealism applies and suits the actions of Russia that has 
always had a tough central state power impaired sub-agencies and parties from uttering their 
views. This fact eventually restricts free liberal formations. Consequently, the neo-realist 
thought is equal to that of the state with its recognized welfares. It underlies that Moscow’s 
national interest, specifically reviving its influence in the Middle East, legitimizes its policy, 
amalgamates the citizens’ opinions, and gains the backing of the ruling powers.  In other 
words, it overrides the national interest in order to counter the rivalry of the western sphere. 
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The Russian competition in the Middle East is viewed as a U.S. counterbalance. So 
naturally, with the pressures resulted and impelled by the international system, tougher and 
deeper Russian ties are clearly displayed on the Iranian-Syrian axis.  This sheds light on the 
neorealist perception of win-lose competition: irrespective if it is harsh competition, it is 
primarily aiming to ensure their survival and guaranteed interests. According to Hopf, (1999), 
under this umbrella theory, Russia faces a security dilemma with the role of a "great defensive 
power (as opposed to the role of a global superpower)” (p. 62), and the structure or the 
distribution of power in our world, are determinants governing the Russian-Iranian- Syrian 
interactions. These include the arms industry buildup, the increasingly assertive political and 
military ties, and the support of nuclear power acquiring (Hopf, 1999). 
The Russian foreign policy in the Middle East is complex in nature and its position in the 
Middle East, more specifically towards Iran and Syria, will be viewed through the 
contemporary form of realism, presented by the neorealist Kenneth Waltz. This is based on an 
anarchic international system, where central authority is totally absent (Wieclawski, 2011).In 
this sense, this paper considers today’s system as imperfectly unipolar, with a weakened U.S. 
as a mere power, and not a central enforcer. Neorealism, the Waltzian reframed Realism, 
concentrates on the “nature of the system-level structure and avoided the need to make 
assumptions about human nature, morality, power and interest” (Waltz, 1959). In this sense, 
pressures of this anarchic system in this globalized world order, according to Waltz, are the 
basic agents that outline results, regardless of the nature of the regime or ruling personnel 
(Waltz, 1959). Applying the neorealist theory of Waltz and Robert Giplin in our world today 
highlights the significance of the hegemonic rivalry in the international arena. From a system 
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structure lens, dynamic changes since the cold war till today are greatly evident (Feng & 
Ruizhuang, 2006). 
In addition to that, Waltz’s theory tackles an important general principle governing the 
relations and behaviors of states in today’s international system; the balance of power in 
parallel with the security dilemma principle.  Waltz (1979) states that “Rational countries 
living in the state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious and hostile to one 
other because of their tense relations although that was not their original idea” (p.231).In other 
words, states “seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal 
domination, aiming to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing 
economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances)” (Waltz, 1979, pp. 
116-128). This operates best in the self-help system or anarchic world order where central 
power seizes to exist. 
This paper strongly supports the stream of thought that states are viewed as rational 
actors, who see the world in a neutral eye, and who evaluate objectively the material power of 
other states, upon which their foreign policy is conducted (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 5-56). This 
school lies in between structural theorists and constructivists (Wintour, 2010).Thus, states, 
actors looking after their various interests and security, will most certainly be the main 
innermost foreign policy determinants. 
According to Morgenthau (1978), in reference to the anarchic world, this thesis 
supports the Hans Morgenthau’s assertion that states “act in terms of interest defined as 
power,” (p. 5) yet from a neorealist approach, they have no choice but to seek power to 
maintain survival (Deibel, 2007). It is interesting to examine the constructivist realm, 
contending the anarchic state of the international system, does not imply its self-help nature. 
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“Constructivists thus maintain that the construction of national interests depends largely on 
how the identities… relate to one another” (Hopf, 1999).  
1.5 Methodology and Research Design  
The thesis will use the case-study design. The cases to be investigated are the Russian-
Iranian and Russian-Syrian relations. These two cases will be looked at from an analytical 
framework, providing background information and general history analysis. These two case-
studies have been chosen because they do not only best investigate the revival of Russia as a 
major power, but also will confirm the neo-realist approach to the study of international 
relations. 
This study will as well apply a comparative approach to understand the comparison 
between the position and the affecting variables of Russia in different historical periods to 
determine the factors  allowed it lately to reassert itself as a major power. The research will use 
secondary data references such as books, academic journals, newspapers, and articles reflecting 
numerous observations. Figures and tables will be added as quantitative data resources as 
indicators to support the thesis argument presented. Recent up to date analysis will also be used 
to document, with a fresh insight, the positions of Russia, Iran and Syria.  
1.6 Literature Review 
Many have been baffled by this subject as a result of the extensive literature and 
ongoing discussions amongst experts. However, the topic itself remains subject to stereotyped 
affiliations and biased point of views. After reviewing a wide literature on the topic, a number 
of studies could be of great assistance to this thesis. According to one group of academics, 
many of the literature they produced was skeptical and looked critically to Russia’s position 
towards Iran and Syria claiming that Russia might be gambling and putting its interest at risk 
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by supporting Syria and Iran. However, studies conducted by scholars as Freedman ( 2002) and 
Katz ( 2006) analyzed the takeover of the current president Vladimir Putin of old Russian 
Iranian relations from the former Yeltsin, and the early rise of the Russian Iranian relationship 
in the Putin Era. Thus, they shed light on historical aspects and influences mobilizing this 
relationship.  Kreutz (2002), Ginat (2001), and Omestad (2007) provide important approaches 
on the basic features highlighting the main explicit reasons as to the reasons Russia is 
interested in Iran. They stress on the economic gains (oil, arms sales, …), and its geographical 
importance whereby Russia finds it a great loyal client to oppose the US expansionist policy 
and prevent the scenario of a new American Middle East. In the same sense, scholars like Aras 
and Özbay (2008) argue that Russian-Iranian relations are a strategic cooperation whereby  
[a] strategic alliance is a kind of broad security relationship that may involve, 
among other things, cooperation for the attainment of common goals on matters 
of military assistance, defense [sic] industries, joint military maneuvers, 
intelligence sharing, deployment of military divisions in partner countries, and 
military training. For the establishment of a strategic alliance between any two 
states, there must be consensus and cooperation with respect to their 
worldviews, political regimes, long-term interests and universal values. (p. 56) 
  
Kreutz, Ginat and Omestad (2002,2001,2007) share the same view as Mark Katz, since 
they all explore two main conflicts Russia is facing today; the Chechnya regional conflict and 
the Caspian Sea Oil problem, reflecting on the disagreements an cooperation between Russia 
and Iran- whether pragmatic or strategic- having shared aims. Moreover, scholars such as 
Milhollin and Lincy (2004), Katz (2006), and Khrestin and Elliott (2007), have discussed the 
issue of the Iranian nuclear crisis, and its effect on US-Russian relations. On the other hand, 
Gvosdev and Simes (2005) explore the position of the US towards the double sided foreign 
policy of Russia towards Iran. In an extensively consuming research over the topic, Aras and 
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Ozbay (2006) and Simpson (2010) walk around the implications of this nuclear prospect and 
the way Russia is formulating its policy to suit all sides; US, Iran, and the UN.  
Then again, literature on Russian-Syrian foreign policy describes the strong historical 
friendship between both states, regarding the arms export significance between Russia and 
Syria. Magen (Ambassador), and Shapir (2012) discuss Russia’s policy, presenting figures and 
its implications on the Russian reputation. Lipman (2006), Seale (2012), and Widlanski (2005) 
heavily portray the way Putin is directing Russia to strengthen its engagement in the Middle 
East; especially in order to enhance security and reflect the challenges posed on its US 
relations, due to its strong relation with Syria as Nichol (2012) discussed. Also, Seale (2012), 
Friedman (2012), Dergham ( 2012) and Kramer ( 2012) shed light on the current events in 
Syria, with Russia’s strong position in backing the Assad’s regime, and opposing any kind of 
intervention. 
This thesis will try to rectify few gaps found in the literature, by shedding light on few 
aspects that were disregarded by writers on this topic; major reasons allowing the Russian 
powerful stand, and the primary goal of the Russian actions to revive it influence. 
1.7 Preview on the Chapters 
Highlighting the Waltzian theory applied to the Russian foreign policy in the Middle 
East, and touching upon the fact that states directed by their self-interest, this thesis will 
discuss the below subtitles of foreign policy objectives. It is important to note that the 
determinants guiding Russia’s Middle Eastern foreign policy will be argued from a diplo-
spoken flexible Russian strategic opportunism. In other words, Russian balancing role will be 
demonstrated from a strategic aim; the Syrian turmoil and Iranian nuclear issue, the protection 
   
 
10 
 
of strategically vital interests, and the reshuffling of all possible cards. All this targets the 
resuscitation of the Soviet supremacy in the Middle East. 
Following the thesis introduction, chapter two starts by a historical overview of three 
main phases in the Russian- Middle Eastern relation; before, during, and after the cold war era. 
The main aim is to portray that Russia has always been trying to be influential in the Middle 
East, but not always was it able to do so. Then, the chapter will analytically examine an 
ongoing dilemma; why has Russia decided to act now? Different answers could be offered; yet, 
the thesis expounds how Russia is making use of changed domestic status, changing Middle 
Eastern political orders, and declining U.S. role. Taking into account the last three factors, 
Russian revival is viewed in the Middle East.  Chapter two demonstrates the importance of the 
Middle East to Russia and how to prove its revived power. Moreover, the chapter focuses on 
Syria and Iran as primary alliances for Russia before, during, and after the Cold war; especially 
during the Putin Ira. Chapter three discusses the factors that allowed the Russian fierce return. 
The factors will be divided into three sections: locally, regionally, and internationally. Chapter 
four highlights the Russian-Iranian relations starting with the Iranian nuclear threat and ending 
with a detailed interpretation of the Russian-Iranian considerations. Light will be shed on the 
use of Iran as a US pressuring card and a counterbalancing tool. Chapter five follows an 
identical sequence as the previous. In this chapter, the Russian-Syrian axis is addressed. The 
opening part picks up on the historical analysis of the relation between Russia and Syria, and 
the long-lasting rapport and support of the Assad’s regime. Next, the chapter looks at the 
Russian-Syrian considerations, analyzing how both sides are engaged in this rapport, with all 
their internal, regional and international facets of costs and benefits.  
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As the introductory chapter and the conclusion in chapter 6 have demonstrated, the 
focus of this thesis in analyzing Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East cannot be 
confined to the objective of gaining important economic or geopolitical rewards. Primacy to 
regaining a hegemonic role in this region is the utmost strive.  After reviewing the various 
subtitles of cooperation on both the Iranian and Syrian axes, the final chapter concludes with a 
linking theme for Russia’s support of both. Keeping in mind the implied perspective of a 
change in the balance of power, along with the explored wide difference in the outlook of 
US/Israel towards Russia, all these played an important art in allowing Russia to stand fiercely, 
now, against the U.S. This rendered the Middle East, for Russia, as the route to regain its 
influence over the international community as a whole.   
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
Importance of the Middle East to Russia 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical background of the Russian relations in 
the Middle East with a focus on Syria and Iran. This essential historical background material 
will highlight the importance of the Middle East to Russia. Also, it will demonstrate that this 
importance was the reason behind the Russian/Soviet Union’s constant attempts to establish 
relationships or alliances in the region to face other major powers presence and actions. It will 
demonstrate as well that Russia had always challenged other powers in the Middle East 
through alliances with states and had always considered the Middle East as an arena to prove 
its major power status.   
2.1 Proximity importance  
 
   
 
13 
 
The proximity areas of Russia include its major strategically, geopolitically, and 
economically zones of influence; from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, located between the 
Red Sea and the Arabian “or Persian” Gulf, and between Africa and Eurasia on the other side 
named the “Arabian Peninsula”. This area has an important and direct weight on the 
international and domestic Russian state of affairs, affecting its vital interests in three ways: 
1- This proximity has an effect on the geostrategic, political or military, Russian 
access to the warm waters and world oceans, mainly the Indian Ocean. 
2- The close touch with the major oil and gas producing nations, mainly located in the 
Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula, opens wide energy rich opportunities for 
Russia. 
3- The crucial significance of the Muslim factor; a neighboring the Muslim Arabian 
peninsula and a Russian fast growing Muslim community, estimated more than 
16% of the Russian population (Kreutz,2004). 
From a geopolitical perspective, Moscow has always thrived to form a power coalition, 
whereby it acts as the principle actor. Regional partners and allies in the Middle East were of 
potential importance for Russia to achieve its goal of spreading influence and protecting its 
interests against growing opponents. 
2.2 Historical Review of Russia’s influence in the Middle East - Iran 
and Syria in focus 
As we have seen, Russia’s vital interests lie in its proximity area. As we have also 
previously noted that one of the basic point of the neorealist approach upon which this topic 
stands, is the balance of power aspect. This historical review towards the relationship of Russia 
with several Middle Eastern states, most focused on Syria and Iran, is based on a Russian quest 
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for power, to balance American ambitions. Balance of power in this sense, throughout all the 
historical phases highlighted, is a balance against superiority, threats and capabilities. In other 
the throughout the historical phases, the act of seeking alliances is under the aim of power 
balance and proof of revived capability. 
 2.2.1 Before the Cold War Era 
Russia is no stranger to the Middle East. Historically, before the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, the Russian empire was as involved politically with the Arab world as much as today. 
It was mostly known for its major attempts to build a railway to link the Mediterranean to the 
Gulf and a coaling naval station in Kuwait to compete with the British navy supremacy in the 
region. 
During the Tsarist Empire era (1547-1917), Russia had a major power force. Russian 
leaders contested with the European powers to fill the power vacuum of the failing Ottoman 
Empire and to extend its influence from the Black sea until the Mediterranean (Zürcher, 
2002).Russia signed two treaties with the Ottoman Empire that aimed at mutual assistance to 
the Sultan. One was in 1805 against Napoleon and the other in 1833 after sending a Russian 
naval unit to Istanbul supporting the sultan in calling for the cession of the whole of Syria. The 
July 1833 Treaty of Hunkar-Iskelsi  
marked the zenith of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire, in a secret 
article, the Porte promised to assist Russia when necessary by closing the 
Dardanelles against the ships of any other Power, thus securing for Russia a pre-
eminent position at Istanbul (Salibi, 1976, p.33). 
 
This shows that it is not new for Russia to attempt the establishment of protectorates 
and supporting certain actors in such region, whereby also challenging other powers. In 
addition, to reinforce its interests and to control its alliances and proxies, Russia played a major 
role in protecting the Greek Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire, such as 
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condemning the abuse of Balkan Christians and Slavs. This was another dimension of the 
Russian support of certain actors in its quest for dominance. 
In addition to that, Russia also had a great desire in the Persian Gulf. This resulted in 
the First Russo-Persian War (1804-1883), which according to Daniel (2012) 
War was in many respects a continuation of a struggle for supremacy in 
Transcaucasia dating back to the time of Peter the Great and Nāder Shah, it 
differed from earlier conflicts between Persia and Russia in that its course came 
to be affected as much by the diplomatic maneuvering of European powers 
during the Napoleonic era as by developments on the battlefield. As a result of 
its weakness, Persia could not deter Russian threat of interference in its own 
affairs. With the Russian pressure on local communities, two of the important 
tribes of middle Caucasus, the Ossetes and the Lezgians, accepted submission to 
Russia in 1802 and 1803, while Mingrelia accepted the dominance of Russians 
in 1804 and Imereti in 1810.  
This was followed by the Second Russo-Persian War in the late 1920s, which led to a 
continuing power decline in Persia.  
After the outburst of World War I, Russia, an ally to Great Britain, established the 
Constantinople Agreement of 1915, which instructed that after the war ended, Russia would 
take over the Turkish straits. This policy aimed at reserving Russia in the alliance formed.  
However, the Russian Tsarist Empire did not last to ripe the fruit of success (Karami, 2011). 
After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and the establishment of the Soviet Union, 
Moscow started to look for allies in the Middle East by assisting the “revolutionary movements 
in the dependent and subject nations and in the colonies” (Kreutz, 2004, p.4). 
The years between 1921 and 1926 witnessed new treaties of non-aggression were 
concluded between the communist regime in power and Turkey, and Afghanistan along with 
friendship treaties with Iran (Karami, 2011). Nevertheless, despite the rapprochement between 
the Soviets and the King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud till 1932, and the Soviet interest in preserving 
his growing power in the Arabian Peninsula, the Soviet-Arab relationship; however, were 
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unstable and lacking any profound strategic and ideological content. This tensed relationship 
was to remain until the Cold War. They were simply limited. However, having similar 
intentions of extending their friendships and allies, support was drawn-out to Yemen (Karami, 
2011). 
 After the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the 
Soviets had to ensure a secure path for their war material. Hence, the Soviet Union occupied 
Iran, and both concluded the 1942 agreement, along with Great Britain under the condition that 
they left with a maximum of six months period after the war ended.  Despite U.S pressures on 
Moscow to pull out from Iran, just as the British did in 1946, the Soviets refused. This was an 
obvious implication of the Soviet Union’s expansionist aims in the Middle East, Eastern 
Europe, and the Far East (Yesiltas & Inat, 2005).  The USSR further renounced the former 
treaties with Turkey, renewing their assertion over the Straits.  In addition to that, it was 
overtly known that the Soviet Union was the hand behind the 1945-1946 uprising of the Azeri, 
which resulted in the Iranian recognition of Azerbaijan, and 1946 withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Iran (Yesiltas & Inat, 2005).   
2.2.2 During the Cold War Era – Until 1991 
The Cold War period was characterized by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and 
the U.S., the policy of both powers was to rely on proxy states; Israel and Iran were client 
states for Washington while Syria fell under Russian influence (Cold War, 1947-1991). The 
Soviets had the ability to challenge the U.S. through its alliances and support of actors. 
The Soviet Union, with a belief that the new founded State of Israel would diminish the 
British influence in the Middle Eastern region, was the first country to recognize Israel on 17 
May 1948, adopting a pro-Zionist policy. It aimed at supporting the actor that would boost its 
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influence; however, the USSR soon switched sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict in support of 
Arab states. It chose its clients and entered a war by proxies, which provided it with the ability 
to face the West. It was not the actor itself which was important for the Soviets, instead it was 
the aim behind its support. The massive buildup of U.S. power in the region was perceived as a 
security threat by the Soviets; thus, the post- Stalin era was a period where the U.S.S.R. strived 
to counterbalance U.S presence along its Southern vicinity through its choice of clients. 
The Syrian relationship with Moscow developed mostly between the Baath Party and 
the Socialist Ruling elite in Moscow.  
Moscow seemed to hope the then-powerful Syrian Communist Party 
might at least share power with the virulently anti-Israeli and anti-Western 
Baath Party. But the Syria Baathists feared the communists and agreed to the 
1958 merge of their country with Egypt and even accepted the leadership of the 
latter’s ruler Nasser, partly in order to get his help in suppressing the 
communists (Katz, 2012, p.1) 
 
In 1955, namely after the founding of the Baghdad Pact as the fruit of President 
Eisenhower’s administration, in its efforts to build an anti-Soviet alliance (Milestones, 1953-
1960), the USSR impressively revived its active role in the Middle East. During that era, the 
Saudi non- participation and the Iraqi withdrawal from this ‘American initiative’ were praised 
by the Soviets who were also showing increasing support towards the Palestinians as well as 
with the “progressive” Arab states.   
Counterbalancing U.S. influence in the Middle East was a mere part of the larger 
superpower competition, whereby the Soviets had an expansionist aim in the Middle East 
securing a viable presence in the region; increasing what could be described as the “belt of 
Soviet satellites and military bases” (Kreutz, 2007, p.126). From 1955 till 1960, Syria received 
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a great deal of military aid by the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, to strengthen the alliance 
between the two states (more than $200 million)(Kreutz, 2007). 
Denselow (2010) says, 
Since the 1950s, tens of thousands of Syrians have been educated in Russia, 
while Russian expertise has created much of Syria's infrastructure, with the 
Syrian ministry of economy estimating that the Russians are responsible for 90 
industrial facilities and pieces of infrastructure, one-third of Syria's electrical 
power capability, one-third of its oil-producing facilities and a threefold 
expansion of land under irrigation – aided in part by assistance with building the 
massive Euphrates dam. (p.1) 
 
On the other hand, the ideological differences between the Saudi Islamism and the 
Russian communism grew dramatically after the creation of a Soviet satellites belt around the 
kingdom composed by the new South Yemen Marxist regime in 1967, Ethiopia and Somalia 
following the Horn of Africa revolutionary changes in the following years, to reach its apogee 
during the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 (Wheeler, 1959). In parallel, 1967 and 1973 
marked a full Soviet engagement in the Middle East through the political and military support 
of the Arabs, in their two main wars against Israel. The USSR was the sole arms provider for 
both countries’ armed forces, in addition to maintaining high levels of political and trade 
relations with both Syria and Egypt. The Soviet support for those two allies proves the constant 
challenge with the United States. 
In 1971, with the coup that brought Hafez al Assad to presidency, strengthened 
relations with the USSR continued, reaching the climax with the 1971 Soviet naval base 
construction in Tartus. A second war against Israel was surprisingly embarked by Egypt and 
Syria yet ended with a victorious Israel, a frightened Moscow compensating her allies, and a 
recognized role for the American ability to end the Israeli- Syrian confrontation and leading to 
an Egyptian- Israeli peace process (Derek, 1988). Nevertheless, this last move re-endorsed the 
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enmity view towards the U.S. with the Syrian belief of an American aim to dominate the 
Middle East instead of positively brokering for peace (Derek, 1988). Arriving to the Mid 
1970s, the Lebanese civil war erupted in April 1975, and the Syrian intervention and support to 
factions displeased Moscow, increasing the fractures in their alliance.“The Soviets, who 
supported the PLO and other leftist Muslim groups, openly criticized Syria's intervention. The 
Soviet newspaper Pravda stated that Syria harmed the Palestinian and Lebanese ‘national 
patriotic forces’ and demanded that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon” (Sharnoff, 2009, 
p.2). 
Nevertheless, they decided to overcome their differences. After the signature of the 
Camp David Accord in 1978, Egypt left the Soviet orbit, leaving Syria alone as the only Arab 
state facing Israel and orbiting within the Soviet Satellite in the Middle East, and later on 
signing the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow (Freedman, 1991). 
On the other hand, the relationship with Iran went through different phases. Since the 
19
th
 century, Iran (Persia) was struggling to counter the Russian empire dominance against it. 
Two major wars and a series of military campaigns forced Persia to cede many of its major 
cities to the growing Russian armies. It was not until the Russian Revolution that the Russian 
dominance started to shake inside Iran. However, Russia continued its efforts to establish 
socialist and communist republics in Iran inside 1920. But those last ceased to exist during 
WWII after the common Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. At the end of WWII, the 
American dominance was clear in the Iranian political arena leading to converting Iran into 
anti-communist block; especially during Pahlavi era, which seceded to the Islamic Revolution. 
This also led to the creation of the Islamic republic of Iran whose incompatibility against 
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communism left Saddam Hussein of Iraq benefit from the full Soviet military support in its war 
against Iran. 
In parallel, with the Islamic revolution of 1979, and the Soviet change of view towards 
Iran being an ally of the U.S., aspirations towards having a communist supportive government 
were high. However, the Iranian Islamic ruling body instigated threatening sentiments of 
Islamic nationalism within the Soviet territories which encompassed a huge Muslim populace 
(Barylski, 1994). With an antipathy reflected towards both, U.S. and the Soviet Union, those 
two actors were forced to find a balance for the international order. Even with the replacement 
of the Shah’s regime in Iran and the ruling of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the relation 
between Moscow and Tehran remained unfriendly. This revolution proved to be an 
overwhelming ideological impediment to the maintenance of good relations between the two 
countries. “The Soviets backed Iran’s Tudeh Communist Party and other leftists against the 
radical Islamists. Iran also paid a heavy price during the decade-long Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, when it absorbed some 2 million refugees who fled the conflict” (Katz, 2010). 
Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was viewed as exceedingly 
menacing to Iran, and worsened the relationship. Notably, the downfall of the Shah of Iran and 
its replacement by the Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution was partly due to a deliberate  and 
calculated US plan devised by Brezinsky and backed by a few European powers to curb the 
expansion of Communism into the Middle east and Asia by creating “an Islamic Crescent” 
around the Soviet Union.  
Throughout the 1980s, Iran and Iraq were major points of reference when discussing 
the historical relation of the Soviets and the Middle East. After Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, the 
war lasted for eight years with neither country gaining apparent gains. The opening of the 
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invasion returned a fair deal of accomplishment for Iraq. The Soviet supply of weapons to 
Iraq’s campaign was also threatening to Iran. However, this did not last for long. It was partly 
due to the Kremlin’s renunciation of support; the last was not consulted prior to the launching 
of the invasion (Balfour-Paul, 1984). Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to sustain “strict neutrality” 
with both sides during the war, whilst unsuccessfully trying to negotiate for peace, merely 
resulted in the stained relation with both parties (Mesbahi, 1993). However, Moscow allowed 
Syria to carry on its support to Iran and facilitating Lybian arms shipment (Sajjadpour, 1997). 
According to Barylski (1994), 
The West cultivated Iraq with a view towards moving Saddam Hussein's regime 
into the Western foreign policy orbit. When Iraq attacked Iran in September 
1980, it created unpleasant policy dilemmas for the Soviet Union. Moscow 
halted arms shipments to Iran and Iraq and urged both sides to return to the 
status quo ante bellurn. The Soviet Union initially welcomed Khomeini's 
revolution as an anti-western revolution and Iran's communists supported it. 
However, in winter 1981 – 82, when Iran's revolutionary forces began scoring 
victories against Iraq and the West began replacing Moscow in Baghdad's arms 
purchasing, Moscow resumed arms shipments to Iraq. Iran responded by 
repressing the Iranian communist party and restricting Soviet activities in Iran. 
The Iran-Iraq war ended in a stalemate in July 1988 (p.394). 
In 1982, the war shifted toward Iran whereby the Iranians constantly rejected Soviet 
friendly support offers. The last were mindful of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the overthrow 
of the Shah, thus wanted to win this ideal opportunity to befriend the new anti-American 
Iranian stance.  With the failure of Soviet friendly offers, the last feared repercussions of an 
Iranian triumph; hence an export of an extremist Islamic revolution. Therefore, this period 
marked a heavy military Soviet support to Iraq, with arms sales deals worth billions of dollars 
(Sajjadpour, 1997). 
Taking the above events into consideration, it is important to highlight the ideological 
side of the Russian-Iranian interactivity: Iran has been an Islamic theocracy since the Shah 
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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and a quasi-theocracy with his ousting and the 1979 Islamic 
revolution. It in turn, as feared by Moscow, affects and stimulates the feelings of many Shia 
communities within Russia especially when the administration continues to be considered by 
those as either unethical (Mafiosi) or Orthodox.  
It would be interesting to note here the significance of the Nigorny Karabach conflict 
(1988-1994), and the Iranian security concerns. This clash has had a tremendous effect on the 
relations between Russia and Iran.  Russia and Iran were not on good terms. Russian-Iranian 
cooperation affected by overlapping interests on areas of which most important comes the 
Nagaorny Karabakh conflict.  According to Djalili (2004),  
Armenians and Azerbaijanis were the two major national groups in the 
borderland between the Russian, Ottoman and Persian empires and as such were 
intermingled over territory stretching hundreds of miles…With the rise of 
nationalism and heightened Russian-Ottoman conflict at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Armenians became the most vulnerable community in 
Ottoman Anatolia. And, while a few generations before mainly Shiite 
Azerbaijanis and mainly Sunni Turks might have found little in common, they 
increasingly found common cause – and were identified as one and the same by 
Armenians. This has fed through into the Armenian generalization that 
Azerbaijanis are also ‘Turks’ – and therefore share complicity for the 1915 
genocide. (p.54) 
 
Looking at Iran, an Islamic republic stimulating the religious feelings of the 
Azarbajanis and promising to correct the injustice felt by the Shias at the hands of the 
Orthodox, this dynamism is very real and actual in the minds of the new Russian 
administration. This problem actually granted Iran the means to become more politically active 
in the area trying to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Djalili, 2004). 
 In addition to the religious factor,  
The precipitate breakdown in security and trust in Nagorny Karabakh could be 
attributed to the rigidities of the Soviet state, which had failed to manage the 
political contradictions inherent in Nagorny Karabakh. The heavily centralized 
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system had enforced security through fear but it had almost no mechanisms of 
resolving a dispute between two communities by consensus.... 
(Waal, 2005. p.15) 
Neither Russia nor Iran played the role of an efficient intermediary. The confrontations 
that were occurring throughout the region included Russian-Iranian mutual interests, including 
a common Russian-Iranian support for the Armenians (Freedman, 2000). With the 1985 arrival 
of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party, it marked a radical 
change in Soviet foreign policy. To what concerns us most, he sought conciliatory policies 
towards the west, and improved relations with Israel. Gorbachev frustrated the relations with 
Syria disapproving Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese and Palestinian affairs.  
This historical overview highlights so far that the Soviet Union had the ability back 
then to challenge the United States through support of allies. An important supportive fact was 
during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Israel’s plan was to bring Lebanon under the 
direct U.S. intervention by placing a puppet government and the presence of U.S. marines that 
were not really neutral peacekeepers but to serve the Israelis.  It also aimed at bringing down 
the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) backed by Syria. A signing of the peace accord 
between Lebanon and Israel took place which aim to limit the Syrian policy in Lebanon. 
However, Syria, which was backed by the Soviets and had the support of local allies such as 
Amal and the back then emerging Hezbollah group, forced the multinational forces and mainly 
the marines to leave Lebanon by blasting several headquarters. According to Katz (2010), 
The phase between 1989 and 1999 was a “relatively friendly period” as 
Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin pursued rapprochement with 
Tehran. Tensions eased after several turning points in the late 1980s; the Iran-
Iraq War ended in 1988, the border security problem in the Caspian region-the 
Azeri problem started, Khomeini died in mid-1989, the Soviet Union withdrew 
from Afghanistan in early 1989, and communism collapsed in Eastern Europe 
later that year. (pp. 186-187)  
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2.2.3 From 1990 reaching the Putin Era 
In the beginning of this era, the Soviet Union then Russia marked an explicit support to 
the U.S. on several important international events. Russia perceived backing the United States 
as a sign of its great power status. Starting with the U.S war against Iraq in 1990, condemning 
the last’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union and its successor Russia did not oppose U.S. 
intervention. 
 As a result of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, a weakened Russian Federation 
was its successor, and it was not concerned with ‘anti-imperialist’ policy. Russia continued 
carrying its commitments to the United States on strategic arms control, START I and START 
II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1991 and 1993).  
However, to what concerns us the most in this thesis, during the era of President Boris 
Yeltsin (1991-1999), although the Soviet Union maintained good relation with Syria; however, 
this was a transition period. Syria began to improve its relation with the U.S., and the Soviets 
had no means and ability to stop this rapprochement. The Syrians got into the peace process 
sponsored by the U.S.  The Russian’s had no power not to oppose; Russia was out. U.S and 
Syria were dominant actors. 
The federation’s relations with America deteriorated; however, Russia did follow an 
economic progress, whilst safeguarding its “soft-underbelly in Transcaucasia” (southern 
border), where Iran was the closest Middle Eastern ally (Freedman, 2001).   Under the weak 
Yeltsin Freedman (2001) says,  
Moscow focused its Middle East efforts on Turkey and Iran, both of which had 
a considerable amount of influence in the two regions. Moscow sold nuclear 
reactors and sophisticated military equipment to Iran, as the two countries 
developed a tactical alliance. Russia’s relationship with Turkey was more 
complex, alternating between confrontation and cooperation. (p.1) 
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With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the 
collapse of Communism, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the relationship between 
Russia and Iran witnessed an improved new threat- reduced era. This eventually led to new 
openings. Again with common geostrategic interests; such as limiting U.S. influence, 
countering radical Islamic extremism, along with economic cooperation; the collaboration 
between the two gradually expanded (Karami, 2011).  Nevertheless, Russia did not reveal a 
concrete regional or international step opposing the United States. The focus was shed on 
economic policies, improving trade relations, and on striving for “balancing attempts of the 
Russian foreign policy among Iran, Iraq and the GCC states” (Freedman, 1998, p.147). The 
strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran during the 1995 was a requirement facing the 
NATO expansion and Chechnya conflict at the time.  
 In brief, the major area of cooperation in the Russian- Iranian relation was the Bushehr 
nuclear Reactor, which Russia was constructing in Iran, and which have been witnessing, a 
fierce U.S. opposition. However, the centerpiece of discord was the delineation of the Caspian 
Sea.  
  Moscow began selling weapons to Tehran and promised to complete the  
unfinished Bushehr nuclear reactor. After years of trying to export its Islamic 
ideology, Tehran opted not to side with fellow Muslims during Moscow’s first 
war with Chechen rebels between 1994 and 1996. Iran pointedly expressed 
support for Russia’s territorial integrity in the face of secessionist movements—
a problem the theocracy also faced. In the mid-1990s, Russia and Iran also 
worked together to end the 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan between 
Moscow’s former communist allies and a democratic-Islamist alliance. (Katz, 
2010, p. 187) 
 
The Russian period during Yeltsin rule witnessed a close cooperation with Iran, 
benefiting greatly its proper self-interest despite cancellation of arms deals in order to satisfy 
the U.S. for maintaining good relations. In the mid 90’s, Russian-Iranian relations were 
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becoming more solid and strong as a result of the policies of Yergeni Primakov (Blank, 2011). 
Being elected as Head of Ministry of Foreign affairs, in January 1996, Primakov pursued a 
more operational foreign policy. This was marked in his considerate position towards Iran and 
keener connections with Tehran for a favorable impact on policies in South Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Just as the case of Armenia, a great economic partner to Tehran and a strategic 
partner to Moscow. Such links empower the Russian concept of a “Southern Garden” (Gafarli, 
2012). This is similar to what Galia Golan noted in her famous book- ‘Russia and Iran: A 
Strategic Partnership’, stating how Primakov had a forceful effect on Russian viewpoints 
regarding the Middle Eastern Region.  
2.2.4 Putin in Power 
The first premiership and presidential era of Vladimir Putin started in 2000, and ended 
in 2008. At first, the inaptitude of Russia continued to be evident. With the 2001 U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan, followed by the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, the Russians revealed to be 
more incapable. It was a revived Baghdad pact scenario. Russia was only going with the U.S. 
plan, unable to do otherwise. In the beginning of Putin era, the Russian influence was 
weakened. Its international role no longer existed. Since the 2000s, several events took place in 
the Middle East noted that Russia should take a more active role in this region. 
According to Ruehle (2009),  
The official visit of Iranian President Mohamad Khatami to Moscow between 
12-15 March 2001 can be considered as turning point in terms of the revival of 
Russian Iranian relations asserting mutual cooperation in various sectors- 
economy, politics, social- and comprising interest for both parties, including the 
region as a whole, to promote and reestablish security. Evidently, deals worth 
around 7 billion dollars were made for the delivery of Modern Russian 
weaponry to Iran. 
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From that time onwards, Russian-Iranian relations are evolving along an analogous 
line, with a Russian foreign policy laid down based on geopolitical interest, economic interests, 
and Anti-US pressure aims. 
As discussed in the following chapters, during President Vladimir Putin’s era up until 
this very day, Freedman (2001) says, 
There was a more centralized control over Russian foreign policy as the new 
Russian leader sought to have a more assertive foreign policy for his country, 
and became much more active than Yeltsin had been in promoting Russian 
interests in the Middle East. 
Despite all the above, it is essential to note that standing with Tehran and Damascus, 
whether in support against the West or for different purposes, entails deep calculations. 
However, the “flexibility” that Russia has often unveiled towards the West when it comes to 
the Iranian nuclear crisis, is unlikely used in the Syrian case (Fayyad, 2012), despite diplomatic 
approach regarding the use of chemical weapons. 
By the mid-2000s, although many writers thought that Russia was no longer interested 
in the Middle East; however, it was. But Russia was in capable of acting.  
Moscow has re-established political ties with its former allies, such as Syria; engaged in 
a lively dialogue with Israel; saw Turkey as a key partner in the region; currently 
maintains a thriving, albeit most complex relationship with Iran; and promotes trade 
with energy-rich countries, from Algeria and Libya to the Gulf States.(Trenin, 2010, p. 
3) 
 
As we have previously said, Moscow thrives to develop powerful alliances where it 
plays a pivotal leading role as an outside player amongst the above mentioned regional 
delineating borders: “South Caucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia north of the Middle 
East.”(Trenin, 2010, p.4)  For Russia, this shed light over the major important actors such as 
Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.  Thus, from a geopolitical, economic and diplomatic 
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perspective, Russia has become strikingly more dynamic during the Putin Era as the coming 
chapters will demonstrate. 
Russia, like many other states, sought means to balance U.S. unipolar hegemony 
through having a strong foothold in the Middle East. As Karaganov(2012) (Honorary Chairman 
of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Dean of the School of World 
Economics and World Politics at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics) 
explains, countries depend on four kinds of power instruments to cooperate with other actors 
and pursue a foreign policy of a global power; economic, political, ideological, and purely 
diplomatic. Russia has been relying on diplomatic skills manipulated in a skillful way. The 
economic factor has long been the most overriding on the international agenda being a source 
of influence on global and regional foreign policies. However, today’s Russian reality is that its 
foreign policy and actions depends, for the most part, on the endeavor to maintain a great 
power status and a revived hegemonic position in the Middle East (Karaganov, 2012). Yet, the 
high demand for energy, the nuclear struggle, raw material, and military are taken into account. 
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Chapter Three  
 
 
 
Factors of Russian Comeback 
 
It is true that geography has not changed, but politics definitely did; whether inside 
Russia or in the Middle Eastern countries in concern. The main Russian goal, to come back to 
the influential stage whereby capable of shaping the international decision, has far existed as a 
deep will. Nevertheless, it was not until recently that Russia was capable of returning as a 
major player in the Middle East. Russia made use of four major factors as opportunities to 
reach its goal. 
3.1 Local- Stronger domestic Russia 
In April 2005, President Vladimir Putin notably said: “Above all, we should acknowledge 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” Just as 
in 2004 he famously stated that the “dissolution of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on 
a massive scale”(Putin, 2004).  Putin, former KGB colonel elite, sought to restore Russia’s 
standing. His aim throughout his ruling period is to stir up nationalism triggering old feeling of 
Soviet glory. Putin’s rule included a spirit targeted to wipe out the horrors of the old system’s 
dissolution.  
Vladimir Putin managed to be reelected as president again in 2012 and had the ability to 
consolidate his power domestically. With thrive of national sentiments, he controlled most of 
the government with the biggest political party ‘United Russia’. Through his skillful 
leadership, President Putin worked on convincing the Russian population of his vision for 
Russia holding on to nostalgic ambitions. 
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 Refusing the disintegration of power, Putin has resorted to some authoritative ways and 
repressive measures to tighten his grip over the state; restricting the independent monitoring of 
government agencies, strengthening the court system, and tightening control over the Russian 
media reflect authoritarian leadership. Nevertheless, ruling with an iron fist under the ideology 
and ambitions of a ‘Strong Russian Statehood’ along with the campaign of ‘Great Russia’,  
Putin was able to amend the law to his benefit of another 6 years of rule.  
The ability to convince most of the Russian citizens to believe in him reflects a 
charismatic approach too. Putin also faced minor opposition to his positioning as a global 
leader, whether in the Syrian current Turmoil or regarding the Iranian nuclear program 
development. He justified all his actions by the desire to restore Russian former position on the 
world stage. 
President Putin’s strong domestic hold, reflecting his power to take full charge, enabled 
him to strengthen his bilateral relations with China, India, Vietnam, and South Korea. This in 
turn reveals a powerful grip over Russian policies and relations. He is demonstrating to his 
nation and to the world that he is able to live up to the KGB image he has cultivated, 
reaffirming Russia’s role in the international arena. 
As to what concerns the economic empowerment of Russia, when Putin outlined his 
goals for “Russia 2020,” the average 6.5 percent annual economic growth that his 
economic planners formulated did not seem outlandish. It was well within the margins of 
the growth rates that Russia has achieved during Putin’s years in power… there had been 
great economic changes since the ruble collapse of 1998 thanks to the economic reforms 
of the early Putin years and subsequent high prices on world oil and gas markets. A 
tremendous amount of new money has coursed through the economy, and a lot of people- 
even ordinary one- were a lot better off than before.” (Parker, 2011).  
  “The economy of Russia is the eighth largest economy in the world by nominal 
value and the sixth/ fifth largest by purchasing power parity (PPP)” (CIA World 
Factbook, 2014). “There has been years of economic growth; Real GDP grew by 6% in 
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2005, 7.1% in 2004 …. The 2005 federal budget surplus was expected to reach 7 percent. 
In august 2006 Russia paid off early all its Soviet-ers debts to Western Countries, worth 
$22 billion.” (CIA World Factbook, 2014) Despite the global financial crisis that hit 
Russia in 2008-2009, in 2010 a struggled rebound was evident.  
 
In addition to that, given the world’s increased demand for energy today, Russian fossil 
fuel assets are certainly rising sharply in value. Along this comes the arms procurement which 
is rapidly increasing in parallel with Russian technological improvements. The economic and 
financial power of Russia, with the latest discoveries of gas field and energy trades permits 
Moscow to compete for strategic objectives, primarily its comeback as a major power without 
posing threats over its internal resources or exhausting its own economy.  
3.2 Changed Middle Eastern order 
Under Putin’s strategy that attempts to enhance Russia’s revived powerful position, the 
changes in the Middle East political order has opened doors for Moscow to shore up its 
influence in the region. The revolutions across the Middle East have allowed Russia to 
emphasize its position by trying to act as a mediator. This window of opportunity was seized 
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by Putin to intervene in the ongoing unrest and revive its role as a major actor, more precisely 
in states that are of strategic interest to Russia. The mediating attempts by the Russians are 
focused on countries where it has direct interest in and boost its influence, and strengthen its 
position.  
Russia’s strategy of acting as a “bridge” between the western power and the Middle 
Eastern countries, Syria and Iran, is viewed as an opportunity to bolster its position regionally. 
With this new reality in the Middle East, Russian desire to revive its status has encouraged it to 
promote itself through political initiatives by playing a role in shaping the region’s status quo. 
Nevertheless, Russia is not much comfortable regarding the collapse of the current 
regimes and the radical emergence in its countries of interest. The long-ruling regimes that 
were in place reflected a kind of stability, and Russia has already established partnerships with 
them. Hence, today, this involvement reflects a Russian fear from a changed regime, whereby 
it might not have control of.  Russia has always had a preference to support old regimes and 
their trends that are not Western-oriented and moderately authoritarian. 
From a neorealist perspective, the emergence of those new actors, in an anarchic world 
order, constituted an invitation for countries such as Russia to rapidly rally to intervene where 
instability is evident. The multi-polarity has always triggered Russian foreign policy to react 
and this is the case in the Middle Eastern area. Russia found its way to make use of the 
multipolar yet unstable anarchy to react to American attempts of dominance and support its 
proxies to counterbalance this hegemony.  
Keeping in mind the preference of Russia to old regimes, Russia is in parallel seizing 
the occasion to formulate other options in case their previous allied regimes collapse. This is a 
part of the Russian plan to reacquire its international position as a major actor. 
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3.3 International - Weakened U.S. and international order  
The twentieth century has witnessed several new realities. The Western world that was 
known for an ultimate prominence faces a decline in the face of a new international system and 
emerging entities; whether the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China are the main actors)or 
other evolving powerful states. This shift in power in an obvious changing world inevitably 
reveals a great decline in the United States role allowing other states to take advantage.  
The current scenario is totally different than the 1970s and 80s. This paper believes that 
most likely the U.S. today will fail in its attempt to overpower the Russian power. Three main 
reasons to this allegation could be contested. Primarily, the American economy has shown a 
great decline and recession since the shift in power rests at large on the economic capacities of 
the country. In other words, economic decline has massive consequences on the foreign policy 
of a country; in this case it affects the hegemonic stability of the U.S. “America’s share of 
world gross domestic product (GDP) is much less today than it was, say, 25 years ago, let 
alone at the end of the World War II when it was the only serious player in the world capitalist 
system” (White, 1987, p.185). 
Second, the U.S. technological proficiency is weakened, and a great example would be 
the disappointment in the F-22 and F-35. Next, the Chinese emergence and support to Russia 
shifts the power equation; especially in the changed Middle East. The rise of the Chinese 
power factor is undoubtedly threatening to the American domination because its growing 
influence is witnessed on both economic and political levels. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the Chinese political maneuvering, the following chapters 
show that the United States was not able to count on the international system to support it with 
sanctions on states, an enforce them. Whereas on the contrary, the diplomatic cards of Russia, 
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supported by China, came to yield tangible results. Nevertheless, despite the limitations in the 
Russian-Chinese relation, and the Russian fear of the East, Russia is trying its best to keep 
China close to it diplomatically. As in any power transition phase, the descent of the West and 
the rise of other influential powers, in this case Russia and China, will likely start to create 
security threats and tension. As to what concerns us most in this paper, the decline in American 
strong hold on the international arena and the Chinese backing enhanced an opportunity for 
Russia to promote its influence. 
3.4 The Ukranian Factor 
The Crimean Penninsula is a multi-ethnic populated region with Russian majority. The 
Crimean crisis was unfolded as the Ukranian President Viktor Yanukovych, amidst the severe 
Ukrainian economic crisis, announced suspending further agreements with the European union 
and turned instead to closer Russian deals.  The protests that erupted soon became more 
violent, and the President flew the country.  In end of February 2014, Russian forces began to 
take control of Crimea. After a referendum was held on the question of joining the Russian 
Federation, the polls resulted in 93% votes in support to join Russia (BBC News Europe, 
2014). Yet this has been denounced by the U.S., EU and the Ukranian officials (BBC News 
Europe, 2014). 
Ukraine is considered by Russia as its own backyard. Any threat by the U.S or 
international community to interfere in this Russian claimed territory would result in fierce 
Russian defense. With the west trying to exert a pressure in Ukraine, Russia thus invaded 
Crimea. After seizing Crimea on the 18
th
 of March 2014, Putin has demonstrated no intent of 
further going into Ukraine. By this, he has strengthened Russia’s position as a major power. 
This well-calculated and limited use of force to seize power over its geopolitical interest zones 
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reveal a revived Russian ability, which it was not able to do so before. Through this crisis, 
Russia, in the face of threats by the U.S, the EU, and actors of the international community to 
impose sanctions or involve in a military conflict against her, proved its revived power. This is 
similar to its eagerness to support the Assad’s regime and maintain its fierce position in the 
Syrian crisis. The western threats to exert pressure on Putin resulted in a failure. “We are not 
going to be getting into a military excursion in Ukraine…what we are going to do is mobilize 
all of our diplomatic resources to make sure that we’ve got a strong international coalition,” as 
President Obama told San Diego’s NBC affiliate KNSD.” (Nicks, 2014, p.1) 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
 
Particularities of Russian- Iranian Interest 
 
Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tehran have existed for centuries. Neighboring 
one another, mutual interaction, clashes, and cooperation have always been inevitable. Taking 
into account and knowing the history and the geopolitics of the Middle East and vice versa 
Russia’s relationship with Tehran has changed between them with the alteration of both states’ 
ruling bodies, political balance, and economic calculations. There is no doubt that geopolitics 
have been playing an important role in defining the nature of the relation and its implications 
between Russia and Iran. This is because the expansion towards the warm water and ports  
having open access to the oceans, always constituted a main pillar of the Russian geopolitical 
imperatives.  
Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that although Russia is benefiting economically on 
various levels, precisely on its nuclear development plan, from its rapprochement with Iran, 
this is not the main aim. The main reason behind Russia’s support to Iran is Russia’s interest to 
use Iran as a tool to regain its political influence not only in the Middle East but 
internationally. This chapter will discuss the increased benefits of Russia supporting Iran, and 
show that Iran has become a strategic partner to Russia despite of the threat that the Iranian 
nuclear might constitute to Russia, along with   the consequences of this support on the Russian 
western relations.  
In return to the waning interference of Iran in Chechnya as we will later discuss, Russia 
will offer Iran support, good economic aids, and a strong agreement of nuclear trade. What the 
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chapter attempts to demonstrate is how the issue of the Russian support of the Iranian nuclear 
program has awarded Russia a perfect gamble to recover its prestige as a dynamic actor in the 
international arena and the Middle East. 
The rapprochement between Iran and Russia after the cold war started in 1995 even 
when Russia abrogated of the Gore- Chemomyrdin Accord, the secret Russian- US protocol, 
where Moscow was supposed to restrict arms and military aid to Iran. The relationship 
strengthened with the continued attempts to finish the Bushehr Nuclear Reactor in Iran, which 
was stagnant under the Yeltsin administration (Katz, 2006). This is in addition to the accord 
signed between the two states to supply Iran with the most sophisticated Russian missiles 
named S300. Before going into details in the various pillars of the economic aspect, it is 
important to note that it’s true, what best describes Iran to Russia would be a “strategic 
partner” as it was described in 2009 by the Russian Minister of Agriculture. Interestingly 
enough, Russia strives to endure support and cooperation on Iran’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear program. 
Recalling a sequence of actions few years backward, as a follow up on the Iranian nuclear 
development as a central part in shaping Russian-Iranian relations, it should be noted that “in 
August 2002, with the agreement on launching a long-term program for the development of 
trade, economic, industrial, and scientific-technological cooperation between Iran and Russia 
up until 2012” (Gafarli, 2012, p.145), Russia opened its cards on its plan to back Iran in 
completing six nuclear reactors on Iranian grounds.  
4.1 Nuclear Iran a threat to Russia 
Many had argued, including Russian decision makers, that Iranian nuclear program is 
not only a threat to Russia itself, but also to the world. Such a powerful country as Iran could 
be considered a serious threat to Russia in Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea critical 
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regions. President Putin himself who is currently supporting Iran’s nuclear program has once 
said- the weapons in the Iranian hands are a strategic threat for our national security, more than 
other European countries. This is because the missiles that Iran possesses and can launch are 
able to easily reach Russia.  
Although Russia, as the U.S. does not trust the Iranian regime in its claims that their 
nuclear power will be used only for peaceful goals, it is willing to overcome its worries and 
support this program (Bridge, 2012). The fact shows the insistence of the previous President 
Ahmadinejad to proceed with Iran’s nuclear ambitioning enriching uranium. Russia is willing 
to accept Iran’s ambition due to the various benefits that Russia could get from this support; 
whether economic or a strong support opposing the Missile Defense Shield the U.S. is 
attempting to deploy in Eastern Europe. 
Russia being the major support to the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranian regime 
understands well the price to pay in return for this support. Upsetting Russia will merely result 
in negative consequences concerning their nuclear cooperation. This is because it will be 
difficult for Iran to develop its nuclear capacity without Russian backing. From the Russian 
point of view, this support is not only limited to material and expertise assistance, but as well 
and most importantly, it is one of the factors that deterred any direct action from the 
international community against Iranian nuclear program. However, just as Pakistan and North 
Korea forcibly had the international community accedes to their nuclear possession, Russia 
anticipates that they should just have to consent to a nuclear Iran as well (Katz, 2012).   
4.1.1 Russian Stance vs. the International position 
While the US and its EU allies are convinced that Iran is pursuing a nuclear 
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development to get hold of the A-bomb, Tehran consecutively assures that a peaceful aim is 
entailed behind its nuclear program, mainly to keep the oil supply intact.  
It is only that on the surface, Russia has approved four international resolutions 
condemning Iran, yet it has not taken action to convince that last to halt its 
nuclear project. Russia has been doing its best to ensure the continuation and 
sustainability of the crisis. It has been doing so to weaken US supremacy in the 
region, and in the process has disregarded its pending issues with Iran in the 
Caspian Sea… chosen to ignore the possibility that Iran may turn into a regional 
superpower in a way that might conflict with its own interests in the region. 
(Fayyad, 2012)  
 
Nevertheless, Russia always had a great fear that supporting the UN and the US in 
imposing sanctions against Iran, might be a risk to lose an immeasurable treasure of stakes in 
Iran (Katz, 2006). Therefore, Putin’s goal was convincing Iran to enrich Uranium in Russia and 
sending it to Tehran, which is a solution accepted by the US (Reuters, 2007). This would be a 
way to ensure that Tehran has no military nuclear program, and has no need for the Uranium 
enrichment facilities. On the other hand, since the year 2004, Russia has been manipulating 
Iran by threatening it to support the United States and the voting of the IAEA (International 
Atomic Energy Agency) council meeting to refer Iran to the Security Council for sanctions. 
For this reason, on February 4
th
, 2006, Russia joined the IAEA board, but it always assured its 
refusal of the use of force in any measure taken (Omestad, 2007).However, at the 2006 annual 
meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Putin and Ahmadinejad reached a 
settlement and made a leaping improvement in their negotiations. It was evident with the 
dynamic development of the relation between both as a repercussion of the Shanghai meeting. 
Russia , at least markedly, set aside its fear of the conservative ruling with Ahmadinejad’s rise 
to power and the ensuing of radical policies looking back at the 1980s.  
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 This maneuvering policy of Russia cannot be hidden. An astounding event took place 
in October 2007 when the visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Iranian president 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, to discuss the enrichment program, coincided with the U.S. Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s pointing out that the world cannot stand a third world war; especially 
with Iran’s continuous disregard to threat of severe sanctions and continuous activity of 
uranium enrichment facility.  
In this ‘war of nerves’ played, Lukyanov reflects upon a psychological warfare, 
whereby both, Iran and the U.S. are involved in a ‘game of brinkmanship’, both reluctant on 
taking actions against each other. U.S always puts an effort to frustrate the Iranian nuclear 
program, formulates steps to amputate Iran from the ‘international financial system’, and 
targets sanctions towards its central and commercial banks, on any company engaged in the 
nuclear development of Iran, and on ‘petrochemical and oil’ industries. Moreover, U.S. aims to 
drag Iran backwards hindering it to pursue its capacity to refine fuel and enlarges its 
investment in this market (Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2012). As a counter reply, Iran warned, “in 
response to the western countries’ intention, to ban the purchase of Iranian oil, Tehran 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, the transit route for a fifth of the world’s oil 
(Lukyanov, 2012, p.3).” 
 The Russian policy, maintained from fully siding with the Security Council on one 
hand and Iran on the other, ensures the continuity of the Russian – Iranian economic 
cooperation. The deals between both are worth billions of dollars. Worth mentioning that these 
deals are  much more valuable to Russia. Therefore, the more active the Russia – Iranian 
relations are, and the more diplomatic and mediating Russia is, the more it would hinder the 
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U.S. administration from imposing sanctions on Tehran until it decides to negotiate (Omestad, 
2007). 
However, one should keep in mind, that no matter what , “the United States may be the 
world’s sole remaining superpower, but challenges like Iran and North Korea cannot be met by 
narrow, cosmetic ‘coalitions of the willing’”(Gvosdev & Simes, 2005). 
After receiving the third and fourth nuclear fuel shipments in 2008, Iran showed the 
whole international community its determination to completing the Bushehr reactor revival, 
supported by a full Russian commitment to back the Iranian project (Iran Receives, 2008). 
Even though the efforts of putting to end the Bushehr nuclear reactor has been interrupted by 
endless postponement, it gave the feeling that Russia was pulling brakes while it was fully 
bound to the job.  
 In November 2011, the contention between the U.S. and Iran boiled up, “with new 
findings by international inspectors, tougher sanctions by the United states and Europe against 
Iran’s oil exports, threats by Iran to shut the Strait of Hormuz and threats from Israel signaling 
increasing readiness to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities” (Iran’s nuclear, 2012). Throughout the 
year 2012, the IAEA issued several reports in February, May, and August describing the 
progress of the Iranian nuclear program and fuel enrichment. The first respectively revealed 
that: there is a “tripling of the number of cascades enriching uranium to nearby 20% and 
testing of fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor and still incomplete IR-40 heavy 
water research reactor” (Quevenco, 2013).An increase in the production rate of low-enriched 
uranium expanding the stockpile from 3.5% to 19.75% with discovery of 27% at Fordu 
enrichment facility (Albright, Walrond, Stricker, & Avagyan, 2013). In late August 2012, the 
report indicated a greater development in the enrichment activities with Iran reaching 2,140 
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centrifuges, 3/4 the amount required to fulfill a nuclear fuel production site. Warrick (2012) 
says,  
Iran had converted some of the 20%-enriched uranium to an oxide form and 
fabricated into fuel for use in research reactors, and that once this conversion 
and fabrication have taken place, the fuel cannot be readily enriched to weapon 
grade purity. (p.1) 
 
IAEA also conspicuously showed great concern regarding Parchin, where suspicion of 
explosive experimentation has taken place revealing evidence of nuclear weapons 
production(Heinrich, 2012).  And so again, on September 13
th
, another resolution was passed 
by IAEA expressing grave concerns and reprimanding Iran for disregarding the UNSC 
resolutions. 
Russia is eventually playing a double card to secure its national self-interest; Bayyenat 
(2011) says, 
First, to be cooperative to the Western powers at the UNSC in order to have a 
say in formulating international policies shaping political outcomes around the 
world and also use its cooperation with the NATO and economic cooperation 
with the Western counties. Second, Russia at the same time also had to appear 
supportive for Iran by watering down the tone of the sanctions resolutions in 
order to preserve its strategic relations to it. (p.1) 
 
Thus, Russia will achieve reviving its position in the Middle Eastern arena. Russia 
might sometimes seem spaced out on one side to the benefit of the other. 
4.2 Why this support? 
The Russian support for Iran yields several benefits for the Russian side on various 
different levels. However, the below gains are not the ultimate reasons that motivate Russia to 
back the Iranians and oppose the whole international community. The perseverance of Russia’s 
full backing of Iran is for its use as a tool to pressure the U.S. and face the international world 
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order. This brings us back to the central objective of Russia which is to return as a major actor 
regionally and internationally. 
 4.2.1Bordering conflict concern - Chechen Conflict 
  
The geographical proximity plays a pivotal role in the relationship between Russia and 
its neighbor Iran, located on the southern border. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
geopolitics became more of a concern to Russia. “Any threat (in this case instability) in the 
nearby region, from any military, economic, or social kind, might spill over and cause 
fluctuations and unrest in the life of the economically incapable Russia” (Kreutz, 2002).  
Hence, what may be considered to jeopardize the nation’s power, security and integrity is a 
nearby shakiness (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). This may be a reason why Putin, remarkably, 
adopted the policy of cooperation with Iran on regional conflicts; specifically, recalled the 
Chechen experience.  
The Chechen conflict was always a source of unrest to Russia, and an intrinsic concern 
for Moscow that couldn’t afford to lose its major access to the Caspian Sea oil, as will further 
be discussed. In addition, the ongoing Chechen conflict could not be discussed without noting 
that it was a major occurrence affecting Putin’s policy and a change of approach in fighting 
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terrorism with the US president Bush and now Obama. Abandoning Washington on war 
against terrorism, Putin joined the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) using it as a 
pressure tool against the U.S. and gaining its unwillingness to meddle in personal affairs of 
Russia and its relations approach to the Chechen problems(Khrestin & Elliot, 2007). 
“Putin came to power largely due his skillful manipulation of popular reaction to the 
alleged Muslim Chechen terrorist attacks in Russia, and the second Chechen war” (Kreutz, 
2007, p.67). Although the victims of the Chechen war are Muslims, Iran has always adopted an 
inactive policy towards the conflict considering it a domestic issue to Russia (Kreutz, 2002).
 
On the other hand, this sensitive stance of Tehran with respect to the conflict in 
northern Caucasus contains many underlying details that are in Iran’s favor. It may be either 
that Iran is behaving cautiously to keep good terms with Moscow, its anti- U.S. ally, or just 
simply because the Shiites of Iran have always opposed and resisted the Sunnis in general, and 
especially the Chechen Sunnis.  
4.2.2 A Sewed Economy- Arms Sales and Oil 
It essential to understand the importance of Iran to Russia from the economic 
perspective emphasizing on two aspects: the arms sales’ vitality and the Caspian Sea oil as a 
key factor. 
 Russia’s economy was greatly affected by the financial crisis that hit most countries 
real hard, “and the stabilization pursuit is now drained” (Closson, 2011, p.1). “The price of oil 
has recovered for now, but Russia needs an infusion of capital into the system in order to 
diversify its economy” (Closson, 2011, p.1). Notably, Iran is one of the best customers Russia 
has in the region, to which it offers great investing deals of armament sales, oil, and gas. 
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The past few years have reflected both Russia and Iran’s efforts towards expanding 
their diplomatic and military cooperation and developing a firmer friendship based on 
common- trade goals and political agendas. Notably, Russia supported Iran with its 
conventional military by providing training and defensive weapons that aided in granting Iran 
further protection against air strikes (Borzou & Mostaghim, 2008). As a start, Khrestin and 
Elliott (2007) say, 
The Russian government has secured lucrative contracts with several states that 
Washington considers pariahs (In this case Iran). In December 2005, the Iranian 
government signed a billion dollar arms deal that included twenty-nine Tor M1 
missile defense systems to protect the Bushehr nuclear facility, (p.23) 
 
and provided training for Iranian on the use of the systems (Russia starts s300, 2008). 
Clearly this shows that Iran has always been an indispensable customer in the Russian – 
Iranian arms industry. In December 2008, Alexander Foumin, Deputy Director of the Russian 
Federal Organization for Military and Technical Cooperation, announced that his country 
looked forward to enhance joint military coactions with Iran. This change would introduce 
greater stability to the region (Xueguan, 2009). Following in February 2009, Brigadier General 
Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, the Iranian Defense Minister, stated that Russia and Iran hoped to 
establish means to expand their military and technical endeavors, thus enriching their defense 
join efforts (Xueguan, 2009). 
In addition, Russia, Iran, and Qatar are ranked respectively as first, second, and third 
worldwide for having the largest natural gas reserves. Together, the three countries account for 
over 40 percent of global natural gas reserves (Pizzey, 2008). Following the progress of the 
“gas troika” in 2008 with Qatar, Moscow, and Tehran has increased this combined force and 
exploited the Caspian Sea reserves (Pizzey, 2008), along with developing some of Iran’s 
immense oil and natural gas reserves (Kashfi, 2008). In 2009, Tehran and Moscow agreed to 
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start with the natural gas trade, which would increase their export productivity and in turn 
surge profits returns.  
On the other hand, it is worth to mention the widely known policy of Russia and the 
United States, named the Reset Policy, inflicting pressure on the Russian-Iranian relation. This 
notably resulted in the delivery cancellation of the S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran 
in February 2010 (Sweeney, 2010). The S-300 is perceived as a substantial enhancement to the 
warfare capacity of any air defense potency, yet the deal was allegedly signed in 2005, and 
supply was anticipated to be in 2008 (Blagov, 2009). In this regard, the Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “there are fundamental principles linked to the sale that we 
never, in accordance with our legislation, and according to our international obligations, take 
any actions that will lead to the destabilization of certain regions” (Sweeney, 2010, p.1).  
Nevertheless, such incidents in the Russian-Iranian course of actions were short-lived 
complications that were inept of destroying this bond. This action took place in parallel to the 
ongoing, as Garfarli (2012) says, 
American military exports to its major regional ally- Saudi Arabia- the total 
worth of the cooperation reached 60 billion dollars- with the complete deal on 
U.S F-15 fighters’ export to KSA amounted to 30 billion dollars being just a 
part of the whole picture. A U.S military export to the Saudis in this framework 
also includes helicopters, missiles, bombs,night vision and radar systems. 
(p.145) 
 
This could imply that the S-300 might not remain halted after all.  
 Another important reason for the supportive foreign policy towards Iran is the Caspian 
Sea Oil dilemma. As noted before, Iran possesses a large amount of black gold oil, and any 
country longing for more power and influence would seek to have good relations with the 
latter, which unfortunately included in the “Axis of Evil “categorization of Georges Bush. 
Russia and Iran have also worked in collaboration at multilateral forums; remarkably, at the 
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Caspian Sea states summits, the two called for keeping Western influence out of the region 
(Kashfi, 2008). According to Central Asia and Caucasus Business Weekly (2007),  
In 2007, the five Caspian states, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan, agreed in a joint declaration that they under no circumstances 
will allow the use of their territories by other states for an aggression or other 
military actions against any of the parties. 
 
On the other hand, the issue of the Caspian Sea oil is a matter of jurisdiction over the 
sea itself. Iran considered that the Caspian Lake should be shared equally among the five 
bordering states. Unfortunately for Tehran, Freedman (2002) says,  
Putin wanted to improve relations with Azerbaijan so as to expedite oil 
production, and the profits from it, from the Caspian Sea where Russia had 
found sizeable oil reserves in its sector of the sea. While Iran has been 
demanding a 20 percent share of the seabed, Moscow had signed an agreement 
with Kazakhstan in 1998, splitting the sea into national sectors, and followed 
this up in January 2001, in a Putin visit to Baku, by signing a similar agreement 
with Azerbaizhan, thus apparently siding with the two major oil producers in the 
Caspian, Azerbaizhan and Kazakhstan, against Iran. (p.513) 
 
This was a step that angered Iran because it received 11% as her own share instead of 
the 20% it was initially entitled to (Halliday, 2001). 
Russia made important oil unearthing in the Caspian Sea, and its only interest was to 
make sure not to allocate them with other involved countries. Russians were convinced that 
having their seabed divided along “national territorial lines” would be more advantageous, and 
that no opposition in the US would be held because Tehran would not be a related participant 
(Katz, 2002).Despite this major turndown for Iran, and the unequal division of the sea between 
the five concerned states; Kazakhstan from the North and the North East, Turkmenistan from 
the Southern half of the Eastern shore, Iran from the South, Azerbaijan from the West, and the 
Russian federation form the North Shore, the Russian-Iranian relationship still survived. 
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 It is important to note that the growing of North Korean and Chinese economy produce 
extreme importance on Russian interests in the Middle Eastern. As we have examined, Russia 
is a major energy sector player throughout the international arena. It has a great aim to uphold 
the high pricing, in parallel to thwarting any key energy generator, from threatening its 
European market. This also projects an important point that Moscow is and will always be a 
main benefiter from the ongoing friction between Tehran and America (Khorrami, 2011). It is 
fair to say that this discord, in a way, causes Tehran to remain vulnerable to Russia’s wishes 
and uncertainties granting it a powerful stand in the international arena. This definitely goes in 
parallel with the fact that Iran tends to be hindered by the sanctions imposed, limiting it from 
acquiring a greater legacy in the field of gas. This definitely supports the Russian’s ultimatum 
in regaining its influence in ‘Central Asia and the middle East’, and endorsing a stronger hold 
over the gas market sector in Europe.  
4.2.3 Iran as a pressure tool against the US and its actions 
 Whether economic or political, the benefits discussed from the Russian support to Iran 
allow Russia to regain its influence in the Middle East and internationally. They pave the way 
for Russia to revive its status as a decision maker that can never be disregarded; especially in 
the Middle Eastern region, and amidst the strong U.S. presence. It can reassert a powerful 
position, whereby no decision could be taken without its consent. 
We arrive to the main aim of Russian support to Iran. Russian intentions are based on 
the countering of American influence in the Middle East and internationally. Putin’s intention 
is so clear; he and his administration have a basic role of restoring the Russian power as the 
former Soviet Union. The American supremacy is an increasing fright to the Russians who 
seek to maintain a strong regional power in the Middle East. “The Russian leaders are 
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constantly genuinely anxious and suspicious about U.S. domination over the Middle East 
especially that Washington encroached in the post- Soviet space in the South and the 
Southeast, particularly in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan” (Kreutz, 2002). 
Here again, Russia’s foreign policy in Iran plays a major role in shaping the U.S. 
foreign policy, but this time, there is a different formula. What concerns Russia’s foreign 
policy is that all emanates from the thrive of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to emerge 
Russia as a Great Power after many lean decades. This pursuit has extended to reach Europe, 
whereby the Putin administration seeks to widen its scope of power and hangs on firmly to 
what influence it has left. Russia’s constant support to the anti- American regime in Belarus, 
Abkhazia, and others, is similar to its regular repressing of minorities as its consecutive 
attempts with the Chechen community. 
In addition, it is evident that Putin, the Russian President, always sought to show the 
whole international community that by holding the key of the Iranian nuclear program, he is 
the only world chief who could coddle with the Iranian, and avoid the Middle East from sliding 
into a war. For Putin, this fact should be well-known by the Americans, and especially by their 
allies, the Israelis, with whom he has kept good and healthy relationships. But for Iran, as a 
Tehran – based analyst, Asghar once said: “Moscow’s position is like a Swiss cheese of 
contradictions. Moscow’s peculiar attitude, which contains both a comparative tone and 
“other” signals, can create mistrust in the long run. Moscow is expected to understand that its 
standpoints should be transparent and realistic” (Katz, 2010, p.186,187). Although this was the 
underlying view of Iran to Russian Actions, they both remained on good will. 
Nowadays, what concerns Russia the most is the amount of concessions it could receive 
form the United States by using Iran and the Russian - Iranian nuclear program as a strain 
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means to put pressure on the U.S. and its actions in Europe. For many years, the U. S. have 
been negotiating the issue of deployment of missile shields and radar tracking systems in both 
countries: Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the two concerned countries agreed and 
despite the NATO’s European associates encouraging missile defense system, which would 
complement the American National Missile Defense system, Russia decisively opposed.  
Russia believes that the Iranian missiles are not the main reason for the American 
deployment of the defense missile shield in Eastern Europe. It is mainly the Russian missile 
capability itself considered by far the most globally powerful nuclear capability. The 
implementation of the ABM (Abti-Ballistic Missiles) is; therefore, considered as a major threat 
for its own peace and security, and in whole Europe’s security. 
The use of the manipulation capability of the Iranian nuclear program has always been 
skillfully used by Putin to pressure the Americans and their politics in the Middle East. It is a 
key on Putin’s hands to apply this strategy of expanding towards the warm waters and support 
the Anti-American countries, including Syria as we will later on discuss.  
Hence, a more hidden factor would be that Russia is seeking to make use of the non-
confrontational U.S. approach and take special considerations on the side of Iran. Therefore, 
perhaps the American regime will disregard imposing sanctions on Iran, or at least gain some 
time in lowering its tone, reducing the arms race, and maybe halting the nuclear program with 
Iran. As the U.S. Secretary of States, Condoleezza Rice, implied on the 1
st
 of June 2007 that 
the U.S. is not seeking an offensive approach to deal with this issue with the Russian 
Federation; instead dialogue is favored. 
As demonstrated by the thesis, Russia is testing its power of influence with the Islamic 
Republic through an on-off treatment- nuclear energy, and weaponry agreements. Whether 
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freezing or launching any step. Russia, by adopting this Iranian pressure strategy, outwardly 
attempts to induce the U.S. consecutive administrations not to go along its forerunner’s policies 
and target to position missile defense amenities in Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
52 
 
Chapter Five 
 
 
 
Particularities of the Russian- Syrian Interest 
 
As was the case with Iran, Russia is currently defying the international community in 
support for the Syrian regime. From economic interests to military and geopolitical ones, many 
dynamics are undeniably important as factors to explain Moscow’s behavior towards 
Damascus during the Putin era, and especially throughout the Syrian crisis. However, despite 
all those benefits, what appears to play an extended decisive role in the Russian foreign policy 
towards Syria is the particular aim of promoting a strong Russia and restoring the influence in 
the Middle East and the international world. The Syrian regime represents for Russia the only 
foothold it has in the Middle East to be able to come back on the international scene as a major 
influential actor. 
To understand how this aim is restored and how this Russian-Syrian partnership is 
developing, this chapter will target major elements that are influencing the flourishing of this 
relation allowing the emergence of Russia as a revived great power in the Middle East.  This 
chapter will focus on how Russia revived its decisive diplomacy through the Syrian uprising. 
5.1 The on-going Syrian uprising 
Since March 2011, a three-year ongoing conflict has been escalating in Syria, claiming 
over more than 230,000 lives, witnessing bloodsheds and massacres causing destruction to the 
country. What effectively took place in Syria, governed by President Bashar Al Assad with an 
iron fist, was the rise of a series of protests among the Sunni faction of the population. The 
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protests amounted to the level of a quazi-sunni majority uprising. In fact, some international 
implicit intervention, in the local politics of the country, lead to the inflammation of the 
uprising. The uprising started to be incited by the American Ambassador in Syria, Mr. Robert 
Ford; then by the neighboring states like Israel, Turkey, and to a minor degree Jordan; in 
addition to a full financing and armament efforts led mainly by KSA and Qatar. The Syrian 
Armed Forces were divided into two main factions: the loyal forces to the regime mainly 
composed by Alawites and Christians, and the Free Syrian Army mainly composed by rebel 
officers who stood with the Muslim Brotherhood movement leading the popular movement 
against the regime.  
The first stage of the internal war marked some victories for the rebels, who seized 
important grounds, supported by the West and the Arab countries favoring the fall of the 
regime. The second stage of the war could be summarized by the ability of the regime forces. 
Those last were politically supported by the Russians who kept supplying the regime with 
various kinds of arms and ammunition. Also, they were militarily supported by many 
Hezbollah fighters striving to secure the Lebanese part of the Syrian border, contain the rebels, 
and move to the third stage. In this stage, the regime started regaining lost grounds; especially 
after succeeding in thwarting the rebels against each other, turning them into radical groups, 
same as those fought by the international community, and turning the fight into a war against 
terrorism.  
During this internal clash, millions of Syrians fled to the neighboring countries spilling 
the Syrian internal problem over to the host nations. Syria was subject to many sanctions 
imposed by the international community against the regime, but the firm Russian position kept 
the regime alive and stopped the west from intervening militarily against Syria. Two peace 
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conferences for Syria took place in Geneva, but no results were able to be materialized on 
ground. Therefore, they failed to foster the national reconciliation leaving place for a complete 
deadlock, in which Russia has found a golden opportunity to rebalance its strategic position 
facing the U.S. 
5.1.1 Russian Position vs. the International Arena 
The international community got divided upon the Syrian crisis; the West and its Arab 
and regional allies represented by KSA, Qatar, and Turkey who are seeking a regime change, 
politically supporting the rebels, and waiting for the Assad’s fall. However, this support is 
mostly financial; in addition to an insignificant armed part that was no more able to resist 
against the crushing power of the regime. That last was supported by a well-organized 
mechanism of Russian logistic support, and an Iranian unconditional military one.  
For Assad, Syria’s suspension from the Arab league was insignificant, even the 
sanctions imposed by the UN or the US against the Syrian regime were inefficient and 
incapable of changing the President’s will or his supportive population. On the contrary, the 
regime is still defying all the international warnings by using heavy air force strikes against 
rebel strongholds in the cities and various fronts. On the opposite side, Russia stands firmly in 
supporting Assad’s regime vetoing two UN resolutions against Syria as will be further 
discussed, and it also stood against a western military intervention in Syria even in the form if 
limited air strikes. Therefore, in order to send warning signals to the West, it moved some of its 
naval destroyers to the Mediterranean, and increased momentarily its military presence in its 
naval base in Tartous. In addition to the continuous support in arms and ammunition, and to 
providing the Syrian Armed forces with sophisticated surface to sea missiles, Moscow 
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threatened to fulfill the S-300 surface to air missile system contract with Syria, which alarmed 
Israel, Turkey, the U.S. and the whole international community. 
With the continuing Syrian crisis, seen by the west as an extension to the Arab Spring, 
Russia’s main reason to stand in full power with the Assad regime against the international 
community is its fear of seeing another Libyan or Iraqi scenario in Syria.. The Veto taken by 
Moscow, defied the international community and put its stakes at risk. With this, the Russian 
opinion could no longer be ignored, and any decision on the Syrian matter forcefully required 
Russian support to have it legitimized. With the backing of China, Moscow has vetoed the 
adoption of two UN Security Council resolutions encouraged by western attempts to allow 
them to intervene, in a way or the other, in the Syrian events. The adoption of these resolutions 
would have paved the way in evicting the Syrian dictator, as referred to by the West and other 
nations including Turkey. Russia fears that if the resolution had passed, its aspirations would 
then be desecrated in a similarly hypocrite cynical way to what has taken place in Libya. In 
fact, Russia felt cheated in Libya, as Professor Vitaly Naumkin, the head of Oriental Studies 
Center in Russia, said: “Russia feels that it was cheated by its international partners. The no-fly 
zone mandate in Libya was transformed into direct military intervention. This should not be 
repeated in Syria” (Seale, 2012). From this perspective, it is expected that Russia will 
stubbornly adhere to its principles, remain in a position of control, and never allow the 
repetition of the same act with Syria.  
According to the Russian News Agency Interfax, Gennady Gatilov, the Deputy Foreign 
Minister said on May 30, 2012 that “Moscow remains categorically opposed to military 
intervention in Syria” (Hawley, 2012, p.1). This stance was followed by another supportive 
declaration from the Chinese foreign ministry, opposing the military intervention and 
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denouncing any forced regime change in Syria (Hawley, 2012). In an attempt to analyze the 
reasons for resisting the foreign intervention in Syria, Handa (2012), from the British American 
Security Council asserted that “Russia’s resistance to intervention lies in part in its strategic 
defense of sovereignty and its claim that long-term solutions there can only be achieved 
through confines of international law and the principles of the UN Charter” (p.1).  This is part 
of the multipolar policy previously mentioned aiming at guaranteeing that the West does not 
solely set the world’s priorities (Barry, 2012). It seems that until now, the Russians are still 
succeeding in prohibiting the west and international community from any military intervention 
in Syria.  
5.1.2 Decisive Russian diplomacy- Syrian chemical weapons 
The Russian diplomacy has proved itself to be very influential, not only during the 
Syrian crisis as a whole, but mainly during the conference heldon June 30
th, 2012 by an “action 
group” for Syria, known later as the Geneva I Conference on Syria.. This conference was 
attended by representatives of the USA (Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton), of Russia (Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov), of the UK (Foreign Secretary, Hague), and a representative of China; 
in addition to the first UN peace envoy to Syria, Mr. Kofi Annan. The last issued a 
communique within which the Russian influence was apparent in the refusal of the American 
suggestion consisting of immediately depriving President Assad the power in Syria. Instead, it 
was agreed that “any political settlement must deliver a transition: 
- Offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria 
- Establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the realization of that 
perspective 
- Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all, stability and calm 
- Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence, and is credible 
- The key steps in the transition should include: 
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- Establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers that could 
include members of the government and opposition, and should be formed on the basis of 
mutual consent 
- Participation of all groups and segments of society in Syria in a meaningful national 
dialogue process 
- Review of the constitutional order and the legal system 
- Free and fair multi-party elections for the new institutions and offices that have been 
established 
- Full representation of women in all aspects of the transition (BBC News, 2014) 
Since the UN peace envoy to Syria, Mr. Annan was not able to find or impose any 
mechanism to implement the transition or pave the way to an acceptable political settlement to 
bring an end to the bloody Syrian war. He was replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi in August 2012, 
who started to prepare for the second conference in which he planned to bring both conflicting 
Syrian sides to the table in coordination with Russia and the U.S. foreign ministers. The 
process was accelerated after the chemical attack killed hundreds of people in Ghouta in 
August 2013. The Geneva II conference aimed at finding a way to implement the results of 
Geneva I communique to bring an end to the Syrian war, and to pave the way to a new Syrian 
Republic.  The first round was held in Montreux, on the 22
nd
 of January 2014,  
The peak of the Syria crisis was reached in 2013 on August 21
st
 when the use of 
chemical weapons was witnessed in the Syrian Ghouta region, an outskirt of Damascus. 
Several investigations were held by the international community with no fixed claims on whom 
the attackers were. When it comes to the U.S. accusations, they fiercely incriminated the 
Syrian regime, filed reports, and escalated threats to use the military force if Syrian chemical 
weapons arsenal would not be destroyed. However, President Barack Obama revealed a 
hesitancy and lack of decisiveness to order a military strike.   
Chemical weapons talks in Geneva, including key negotiators, dragged for three days to 
reach the agreement avoiding to the use of force and following a United Nations proposal.  
Although many questions are left unresolved; especially the huge technical feasibility of 
   
 
58 
 
disarmament in the midst a civil war, nevertheless the Russian proposal (supported by the 
UNSC Chapter 7) was favored. This implies that the power of diplomacy proved to be stronger 
than the use of force. Both sides; however, have attained achievements in one way or another.  
The major achievement of the West in the Syrian Chemical issue is simply ‘neutralizing’ the 
Syrian chemical stockpile. This stockpile was creating what used to be called a terror balance 
with Israel, whose own NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) arsenal remained 
uncontested. While the Russian achievement consisted on thwarting the possibility of a western 
attack against Syria, and avoiding an American or European military presence on the Syrian 
soil, this aimed at; therefore, marginalizing once again the Russian role and existence in the 
Middle East. 
Once again, the Russian alliance with Iran and Syria placed Russia as a crucial 
regional player, able to oppose the international community, who was at a point 
submissive to the attacking decision of the U.S. 
5.2 Why this support? 
Similarly to its support for Iran, the Russian defiance of the international community in 
support for Syria provides Russia with various revenues, whether economic or military. 
However, the vital Russian aim behind Syrian fierce backing, having Syria as its only foothold 
in the region, is to regain its presence in the Middle East and internationally; in addition to 
being able to play a decisive role in several other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This way Russia would be reviving its powerful Soviet role.  
5.2.1 Arms sales, military and economic cooperation 
The Soviet foreign policy towards Syria, before the end of the cold war, was mainly 
based on military support and oil trade. This indebted Syria with $13.4 billion. As a result after 
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the cold war era, Russia was compelled to virtually freeze cooperation with Damascus, pending 
a resolution for this issue. This long awaited resolution came to effect during the visit paid by 
President Hafiz Assad to the Kremlin headed by President Boris Yeltsin and his last Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin in July 1999, followed by another visit paid by President Bashar Assad 
to Moscow in 2005, after which 73% of the Syrian debts were written off.  
However, many incidents revealed a floundering relation between Syria and Russia. 
After Putin’s election as president in 2000, Syria and Lebanon boycotted in February, 2000 the 
Multilateral Steering Group for the Middle East held in Moscow (Suponina, 2000).  Further, 
Syria (a non-permanent member of the UNSC) voted against the UNSC resolution 1397 calling 
for the coexistence of the two Israeli and Palestinian states, a resolution not vetoed by Russia; 
this showed amounted tension on the Syrian-Russian axis. Moreover, despite the Russian-
Syrian accord on opposing the American attempts in the UNSC to support a military 
intervention in Iraq in 2002-03, Russia didn’t show any suggestion or will to protect Syria 
against the same scenario back then. This was noted although Moscow and the Russian press 
were quite convinced that Syria might follow Iraq on the American list of the countries to 
invade in the Middle East (Suponina, 2000). 
In addition, Russia, fearing the weapons to go to Hezbollah, revealed a delinquency in 
approving the Syrian request to purchase the 200 Km-range S-300 and the short range, man-
portable “Igla” Ground to Air missiles. This, along with the growing ties with Israel and the 
Russian-Israeli trade and security cooperation, grew concerns on the Syrian side with the 
absence of any agreement between Moscow and Damascus concerning the debt issue. During 
this period, Russia had no major opposing role against the U.S. It was mostly incapable of 
doing so. 
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A shift in the Syrian-Russian relation started to be noticed. Three reasons behind 
softening Moscow’s position and reestablishing ties with Syria according to Dunayov (1999) 
were listed in Izvestia, one of the highest circulating Russian newspapers:  
“ 1- Moscow in particular is capable of persuading Syria to make peace with Israel 
   2- The fact that Tartus on the Syrian coast was Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean         
   3- Damascus was prepared to pay "cold cash" (a figure of $2billion was mentioned) for  
Moscow to upgrade its old Soviet weapons as well as to sell it new Russian ones including  
anti-aircraft systems” (p.1). 
That cold-cash deal greatly helped in improving the Russian-Syrian ties; in exchange 
for Russian flexibility on repaying the debts, Syria would ensure a sufficient flow of cash to 
meet the desperate needs of the Russian arms industry. However, the leadership change in both 
countries delayed putting the deal into effect until 2005 because of President Hafiz Assad’s 
death in 2000 and President Yeltsin’s resignation. Assad was succeeded by his son Bashar, and 
Putin took office as acting president in December 1999, and then held presidency after the 
March 2000 elections. This power succession was followed by several mutual official visits 
done by ministers from both countries to improve relations and eliminate some differences that 
have appeared in the political perception of some key issues.  
Since December 2004, Moscow started by writing off 90% of the Iraqi debt to Russia 
(Udalov, 2004). This move approved by Putin convinced that the post-Saddam Iraq would 
never repay Saddam’s debts, was followed by a similar move towards Syria by canceling a 
large percentage of its debts too. Since January 2005, the Russian-Syrian relations has 
undergone a positive momentum with President Bashar’s visit to Moscow. This visit produced 
a multipath improvement started with writing off 73% of the $13.4 Billion debt as noted earlier 
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and followed by the Russian acceptance to sell newer air defense systems to Syria. This fact 
led to many contracts allowed Russian firms to extract gas and oil and build a gas processing 
plant and a pipeline in Syria (Katz, 2006). Moreover, Moscow allowed Damascus to repay the 
remaining amount of the debt in favorable terms as Vremya novostei has noted:  
The remaining $3.618 billion will be paid off in installments, with Syria paying 
$170 million on the debt in 2005. Actually, only $1.5 billion of the remaining 
sum will be repaid in ‘cold cash’ over the next ten years. The Syrian side will 
invest the rest in joint projects within Syria (Samokhotkin & Suponina, 2005, 
p.2). 
 
On the other hand, Moscow agreed to sell Damascus in a $100 million deal, a vehicle-
mounted short-range air defense system called the Strelets. Furthermore, by signing 
exploration, extraction, and development agreements, Tafnet, the Russian oil company, was the 
first to extract oil in Syria in the recent years, as the Syrian oil minister Ibrahim Haddad 
declared (Katz, 2006). Stroytrans gas followed Tafnet in concluding a contract with Syria to 
build a gas pipeline and a gas processing plant worth $360 million. The major deal was worth 
$2.7 billion, and it was signed to build a Russian petrochemical and oil refining complex in 
Syria (Katz, 2006). 
Furthermore, many other Russian firms showed interests in all aspects of Syrian 
telecommunication fields. Other companies started running agricultural and irrigation projects, 
and many other Russian universities started developing elaborate cultural ties with their Syrian 
peers by receiving large numbers of Syrian young students on a yearly basis. 
In an attempt to explain the reasons of the Russian-Syrian rapprochement in 2005, two 
main political events aided in increasing both sides’ inclination to cooperate. According to 
Katz (2006), “Russia enjoyed much greater access to Syria than post-Saddam Iraq, so it agreed 
to write off most of Syria’s debt to benefit Russian business interests, as has already proven to 
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be the case for the Russian arms and petroleum industries” (p.5) The second was the Syrian 
feeling of isolation due to the approval of the resolution 1559 in the UNSC, called the Syrian 
forces to withdraw from the Lebanese territories; in addition to the American threatening 
statements accusing Syria of supporting the anti-American insurgents in Iraq. Within this 
frame, as cited in Katz 2006:  
Relations between Moscow and Damascus have [recently] grown stronger as 
Syria’s position in the world arena has become ever more tenuous…. To 
somehow shield itself from possible attacks from Washington, Damascus 
launched an urgent search for a strategic partner, and it ultimately settled on 
Russia (p.6). 
 
This was a favorable situation for Russia; although it abstained from voting in favor of 
the 1559 UNSC resolution, it did not veto it keeping Syria under a constant western pressure 
and forcing it to remain in the Russian laps. Had Syria better ties with the west, in addition to 
peace with Israel, the western world would invest more in Syria jeopardizing the Russian 
interests and forcing its companies to compete with much stronger western ones and to lose 
key economic benefits which Putin was not ready to compromise. In fact, the Syrian sense of 
insecurity without any will or ability from the Russian part to defend Syria against western 
threats eased Russian access to Syria. 
Since 2007, 72% of the arms imports into Syria come from Russia (The Week Staff, 
2012).With this, Syria is considered as the largest importer of Russian arms in the Middle East; 
and since 2006, Syria has been placing orders on fighter jets (MiG 29), Jet trainers (Yak-130), 
air-defense systems (Pantsir and Buk), anti-ship missiles (P-800 Yakhont) in addition to 
various kinds of small arms in a $4 billion arms deal (Matthews, 2011). Deals also were made 
for munitions; since 2006 Syria signed contracts totaling $6 billion of which only munitions for 
$1 billion have been shipped, according to CAST, the Center of Analysis of Strategies and 
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Technologies, a Russian nonprofit organization tracking arms sales (Slovieva, 2012). The 
delivery of arms has been taking place despite the internal conflict in Syria;  
Russia has its obligations to Syria under contracts that have been previously 
signed” the deputy chief, head of the military technical cooperation agency, 
Vyacheslav Dzirkaln said last July, “We are supplying arms and hardware of a 
purely defensive nature; it cannot be said we have introduced an embargo on 
military supplies to Syria. (Slovieva, 2012, p.1)  
 
With writing off the majority of Syrian debt to Russia, the Syrian decision to pay the 
remaining amount of debt in cash fueled the flow of contracts with the Russian arms industries, 
comprising the delivery of the Mi-25 Helicopter gunships after being overhauled by the 
manufacturer, said Paul Holtom, director of the arms Transfers Programs at SIPRI, the 
Stockholm-based arms and military research center (Slovieva, 2012). In addition, “A major 
ongoing deal is for 24 MiG-29SMT combat aircraft, although those are more likely to be 
delivered from 2013” added Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at SIPRI focusing on Syria 
(as cited in Slovieva, 2012). On the other hand, other important arms deals have been halted or 
even cancelled for political reasons; a contract for four MiG-31E fighter planes was annulled 
altogether. However, it recently became known that Russia did not actually halt the planned 
delivery of S-300 mobile antiaircraft missile systems to Syria, which would object the 
implementation of a ‘potential no-fly zone’ in Syria (Associated Press, 2013). It has threatened 
the west of resuming the delivery in case the Patriot missile shield will be deployed on the 
Turkish-Syrian border (Pukhov, 2012). 
Today, at this level, Russian military-related firms recruit more than two million 
workers. This faction of the Russian population represents an electorate power that politicians 
can never mess with. The Syrian cold cash helps the future modernization plans of the military-
industrial complex requiring about $100 million through 2020,despite the Syrian checkered 
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history of military payments and  the only 5%of the total amount of the Russian arms sales to 
Syria (Pukhov, 2012). 
Recently, the Russians lost billions in arms deals because of the change of power in 
Libya, according to Mr. Vyacheslav N. Davidenko (Cited in Pukhov, 2012), Russia’s weapons 
company’s spokesman. Similarly, on the Iranian side, the value of the arms deals fell from 
$2.1billion to $300 million. For these reasons, Russia found compensation for its losses in the 
Syrian market during the current crisis, and increased the weapons sales to include a $550 
million deal for yak-130 training jets that can be used as light attack airplanes. In addition, as 
Richard F. Grimmett, the international security specialist at the congressional Research Service 
in D.C. noted, in his annual report: “from 2007 to 2010, the value of Russian arms deals with 
Syria more than doubled – to $4.7 billion from $2.1 billion – compared with 2003 to 2006” 
(Cited in Pukhov, 2012). 
5.2.2 Syria a business partner today 
The economic rapprochement between Russia and Syria continued in the last couple of 
years. Russia has invested billions of dollars in the infrastructure, sea ports, and tourism 
sectors. Very important Russian financial firms and institutions, such as Gazprombank, VTB, 
and Vnesheconom bank, are still working normally in Syria (Peel & Clover, 2012). This 
revealed an increased defiance of the Western imposed sanctions over the country. Also, the 
suspension of the Arab government funds and the freeze of the governmental assets have 
severely affected the financial sector, paralyzed some banks, and deprived Syria from vital 
export markets. This deprivation has prompted Minister of Finance in Syria to say in May 
2012, that Russia “had given us a hand, especially in the financial sphere” (Peel & Clover, 
2012, p.2). Similarly, in a statement issued in August 2012, the Russian foreign ministry 
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declared that the “Unilateral sanctions against Syria, imposed by a number of countries, of 
which Russia is widely known to be critical, are no reason for folding up joint economic 
programs and other plans” (Archive,2013). 
In addition, Russia is an important buyer of Syrian agricultural products; especially 
vegetables and fruits. Besides, Russia assisted in building important irrigation and industrial 
power facilities all along Syria. Moreover, Syria is greatly dominant in the Russian textile and 
equipment (Odiogor, 2011). The Russian government is also funding the education of 
thousands of Syrian officers, intellects, and educated people. 
5.2.3Energy 
The size of Syria’s reserves of natural gas has been lately estimated by the International 
Energy Statistics as 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf); a very limited quantity compared to Qatar 
which holds 890 tcf and Saudi Arabia which holds 283.5 tcf (Solovieva, 2012). In addition, the 
oil production in the country is declining progressively. However, the newly discovered gas 
and oil fields in the Israeli, Lebanese, and, of course, the Syrian international waters, attracted 
the Russian energy companies to sign various long-term natural gas and oil exploration and 
extraction contracts with Damascus. 
Russian companies have already invested almost $20 billion in the energy sectors in 
Syria, as Oxford Analytica, a New York-based consulting firm estimated (Solovieva, 2012); 
Russian engineering institutions such as Tafnet and Stroytransgaz are constructing a natural 
gas processing plant about 130 miles east of Homs; in addition to petrochemical complexes 
and refineries all along the Syrian territory. Moreover, the deals include the construction works 
of a gas pipeline linking Egypt to Turkey and  highlighting the strategic importance of Syria, as 
an energy transit hub on a crossroad in the Middle East, where Russia insists on keeping its 
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foot next to the fast growing Turkey’s economy and the EU, the big gas consumer (Solovieva, 
2012). 
 Before the attainment of these deals, the Syrian sense of isolation from the west 
created an internal feeling of insecurity.Amidst the current Syrian uprising, this feeling of 
insecurity offered Russian industries, an important access to the Syrian polity.  To counter 
western sanctions, Russian government continued strengthening commercial ties with Assad’s 
regime and purchasing Syrian oil, along with China, Iran, and India. With this policy, Russia is 
showing confidence in the Syrian regime and in its own foreign policy as well, defying of the 
west, and undermining the Arab League economic sanctions approved on the 27
th
 of November 
2012 (Russia’s Syrian Power, 2012). 
5.2.4 Fear of Islamic regimes 
Many observers view the Arab uprising as a destabilizing factor for the Arab world, and 
will only lead to empowering the extremist Islamist groups. Prospects of Islamic extremist 
regimes in the Middle East constitute a great part why Russia is supportive of the Assad 
regime. This is truly felt in Moscow due to the previous Russian experience in Chechnya and 
fear of an ignited strife again. More precisely, Russia feels that more than 20 million Muslims 
living in the Caucasus and in central Asia may be inflamed by the Islamic upheaval taking 
place in the Arab world, threatening its domestic stability. It only needs powerful secular 
governments to counter this malign trend (Flanagan, J. S., Kissinger, A. H., Cipoletti, T.J., & 
Zikibayeva, A., 2012). 
Within this context, Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies 
and Technologies in Moscow, asserted in the New York Times:  
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To people in Moscow, Mr. Assad appears not so much as “a bad dictator” but as 
a secular leader struggling with an uprising of Islamist barbarians. The active 
support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey’s Islamist government for rebels 
in Syria only heightens suspicions in Russia about the Islamist nature of the 
current opposition in Syria and rebels throughout the Middle East. (Pukhov, 
2012).  
However, Syria itself suffers from a deep sectarian divide that posed the risk of an 
internal civil unrest; the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim, It is dominated by 
a minority of Alawites, an off-shoot of the Ismaeli Shias, who were accused to be closer to 
Christians than to Shias. This majority is actually backed by the Sunni regional powers, like the 
Gulf kingdoms and Turkey, and internationally by the west. The supporting Islamic Arab 
world to the Sunni Syrians considers the situation unfair and should be corrected from a 
religious perspective, obliging the transfer of power to the Sunnis. The west, on the other hand, 
is supporting this idea in the name of promoting democracy. Thus, opening the Pandora box of 
the internal civil war, a continuation of the Arab spring – the Syrian episode – is an attempt to 
oust the Alawite dictator. 
In fact, Islamophobia is also felt by the Syrian Christian community and by the Russian 
Orthodox community as well; Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolams declined Putin’s offer of 
millions of dollars in support of the church, but he only asked for the protection of the Syrian 
Orthodox community (Barry, 2012). Similarly, during his visit to Syria in 2011, Patriarch Kiril 
I stood in public with President Assad and praised the Syrian government’s protection of the 
Christians. Lebanese Maronite Patriarch took the same stance and, during his visit to France, 
right after his election; he warned against the Christian minorities’ destiny in case Assad was 
toppled (Barry, 2012). Levant Church leaders, alarmed by some ethnic cleansing activities 
done by the under-sieged rebels in Homs and Aleppo, sided with Assad and described the 
western efforts to expel Assad as Naïve and dangerous (Barry, 2012).  
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As a whole, Russian policymakers envision the Middle Eastern developments with a 
greater agitation than the west. The internal Russian conflict with its Muslim population causes 
much of the Russian unease. The discussion with the co-chair of the Carnegie Moscow 
Center’s religion, Society, and Security Program, Alexey Malashenko, reveals major realities 
in Russia regarding religious concerns. The approximate 21 million Muslims in Russia (which 
is 10% of the whole population) are frustrated by the failed policies of the Kremlin, which do 
not take solid measures to enhance their living conditions (Salem & Malashenko, 2013).  
Clearly, this puts the Russian Federation in a vulnerable position, whereby it would be 
threatened by the radical Islam in the Middle East and tremendously affects its large Muslim 
population and its neighboring Caucasus and Central Asia; just as in view of the recent 
Volgograd bombings. 
5.2.5The Israeli factor 
“Now, Russia I believe can play a very important role,  
particularly in promoting a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict...  
So I believe that Russia, in cooperation with a number of European states,  
should take the lead in taking the place of the United States as peace-broker.  
The Russian government should take initiatives themselves in  
outlining a resolution of this conflict, and especially  
in providing the Security Council’s backing  
for it in a binding resolution.” – Patrick Seale 
Since the cold war era, the Russian federation used to play a major political, economic, 
and military role in the Middle East. Russia aligned itself with the Arabs, supported them in 
their wars against Israel, provided them with the majority of their military supplies, and offered 
some political assistance in the international organizations. During and after the Cold War, the 
United States proxied Israel and made a great regional power out of it. In return, the USSR 
proxied many Arab nations, mainly Egypt and Syria. Actually, the contemporary Russia did 
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not change the rules and is still playing a greater role in the Middle East by seeking strategic 
partners by holding strongly to Syria as the last Arab State confronting Israel other than 
Lebanon that is not orbiting around it; in addition to its strategic support to Iran without 
compromising its relationship with Israel. As we have seen, Moscow’s influence in the Middle 
East is greatly dependent on Syrian ties.  
On the Israeli side, it is true when analysts describe the Russian-Israeli relations as 
schizophrenic (Freedman, 2013); On the one hand, Israel was selling arms and assisted the 
Georgian army during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 it also spent decades fighting 
the Arab-Russian allies and succeeded to convince Russia to not deliver the S-300, the 
Iskander, and the MiGs (Baruch, 2013). It also managed to appease the Russian anger 
throughout Georgia’s campaign (Baruch, 2013).  
However, in an analysis concerning the Russian-Israeli relations, Robert Freedman, the 
Professor of political Science in Baltimore Hebrew University listed three Russian goals vis-à-
vis Israel affecting these relations:  
First, Israel is the homeland of more than a million Russian-speaking citizens of 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU), whom Israel sees as a source of its global 
influence. Hence the emphasis on the cultural ties, in which Israelis of Russian 
origin plays the dominant role. Second, Putin is determined to develop the 
Russian economy; and high-tech trade with Israel, especially in the area of 
nanotechnology is a part of his plan. Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major 
issue in world politics, and Putin would very much like to play a role in its 
diplomacy, if not in resolving it. For this reason he continued to call for an 
international peace conference in Moscow and wanted Israel to attend, so as to 
demonstrate the ability of Russia to be a world mediator (Freedman, 2013). 
Russia considers Syria, with its long shared borders with Israel and Iraq, and its vicinity 
to Iran, in very similar strategic position of Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea; a part of its own 
backyard. Thus, it is seriously feared that the Russian bear wakes up again and retaliates if 
Syria gets attacked by a western army or coalition, similarly to what happened in Georgia. On 
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the Syrian part and in its own favor, Damascus desperately tried to exploit the Israeli 
interference against Russia in Georgia; Because Israel supplied the Georgian army with 
military training and equipment, President Asaad, in a statement to the Russian Kommersant 
newspaper said: “I think that in Russia and in the world, everyone is now aware of Israel’s role 
and its military consultants in the Georgia crisis. And if before Russia there were people who 
thought these [Israeli] forces can be friendly, now I think no one thinks that way” (Freedman, 
2008, p.184). By this statement, President Asaad was trying to court the reluctant Russians in 
an attempt to convince them to sell Syria the S-300 surface-to-air, the Iskander-E Surface-to-
surface, missiles and a few MiG-31 combat aircrafts. But all what Asaad has received from the 
Russians was the Russian Foreign Minister’s promise to consider the deal that hasn’t been 
fulfilled yet. 
It is also largely believed that Russian Support to Syria and Iran, and the ties joining 
those countries strengthen Russia’s position and influence in the Middle East; for this reason, 
Russia kept supplying Iran and Syria with non-strategic arms, adding some more weight to 
their military capabilities. Similarly, Russia considers Damascus as a complementary and an 
alternative foothold to Tehran; it was even ready to supply it with nuclear technology. Barrister 
Harun ur Rachid, a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN asserted that: “As pressure on 
Assad grows, Tehran feels the pinch because the Syria-Iran axis provides access to Hezbollah 
in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip and opposes the US presence in the region” (Haroun 
ur Rachid, 2012, p.3). In fact, the great cashes of Russian arms and munitions delivered to 
Hezbollah by Iran through Syria extended the Russian arm to reach the Lebanese-Israeli 
borders. This strategic importance was proved during Hezbollah’s battle against Israel in June 
2006, in which Israel was incapable of scoring a decisive victory over a non-state player, 
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considered a terrorist organization by the west. On the other hand, due to the tight bonds joined 
Syria and Hamas before the latter’s leadership abandoned their political headquarters in 
Damascus due to the Syrian influence and control over many other Palestinian factions, 
Moscow considered Syria, a main Palestinian control factor and influential in the Middle East   
– a staunch ally to Iran and the Lebanon’s Hezbollah group (Mabardi, 2010).  
Furthermore, in an attempt to show a real expertise in dealing with the Middle East 
matters, Putin was the only Russian leader to visit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and since the 
beginnings of the Middle East peace process, Russia became a member of the Quartet although 
it did not play a prominent role. 
5.3Promoting a strong Russia 
The Russian role in the Syrian crisis for almost three years now gave way for the 
Russia diplomacy to be very active in the world community. Most importantly, its diplomatic 
endeavors allowed it to be one of the main sponsors for every peace conference and deals to be 
set. Russia recently emerged as a major player in the UN, diplomatically imposing its will on 
the U.S. and other actors. However, unfortunately,  
One of the most obvious structural flaws with the Geneva II meetings on peace 
in Syria … is that the opposition delegation does not truly represent Syria’s 
armed uprising. It is hard enough to make peace between enemies, but it is 
harder still if one side of the war is not represented at the peace talks. 
 
Moreover,   Russia frustration for the exclusion of Iran from the talks are counted as 
diplomatic achievement for it emerging more and more as a powerbroker after it had excelled 
in diplomacy by influencing President Assad to surrender his chemical weapons.  
Despite the fact that neither Lavrov nor Kerry appear to have set a definite solution for 
the Syrian crisis, both have a common target trying to find resolutions. Russia and the U.S. aim 
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at combating all Al-Qaeda Islamic militants linked factions. This will constitute a common 
ground for both players to continue pursuing their efforts. However, as France noted,  
The diplomatic solution is very much in the Russian hands and it will depend on 
the quality of cooperation between the U.S, the EU and Russia. Russia has made 
important moves in the last month and I believe that chemical disarmament is a 
very important step (Success at Geneva 2 in 'Russian hands' – former French 
PM de Villepin, 2014). 
 
It is clear that the diplomatic effort of Russia have a supreme goal to restore the Soviet-
era power. Nevertheless, Russia is like all other international community players. It strives to 
achieve foreign interests while watching closely its national interests. Vladimir Putin’s foreign 
policy towards Syria is based on main key strands. Russian Syrian relations date back to the 
cold war era, and entails a rooted friendship developed strategic ambitions for both actors. In 
addition to that, Putin seeks to promote the image of a powerful Russia, regaining a prestigious 
outlook; this is the driver behind the current stance of opposing any use of force pushed for by 
the United States or UN against the Syrian Regime and rejecting the concept of state 
sovereignty violation and intervention in domestic affairs of countries.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis began with a general introduction that has examined the particularities of the  
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East during the Putin era, particularly towards Iran and 
Syria, which aims at reviving its great power status. This goal also involves Moscow achieving 
several other objectives in different areas. Although this study was not quantitative, and did not 
consider variables to measure Moscow’s success of this instrumental policy; however, several 
factual details in both case studies revealed the strategic influence Russia is being able to 
achieve. The neo-realist approach to the subject highlighted the anarchical world order, 
whereby there is no central authority enforcer. 
The start was with a historical overview of the Russian foreign policy shifts since the 
pre-cold war era to reach the pursued one in the present date, aiming at intensifying its bilateral 
relations with proxy states that were Soviet-era allies; Iran and Syria. The historical delineation 
of the Russian policy revealed to be incremental to pursue its interests outside the region and 
establishing a political leverage to limit U.S. hegemony. It highlighted the main traits in its 
historical relation towards the Middle East, revealing its intention of using anti-American 
countries, Iran and Syria, as a bargaining chip to expand its operational space.   
After the historical analysis of the Russian foreign policy shifts in three major Russian 
eras, the thesis moved to highlight the local, regional, and international main factors that 
Russia is making use of to act now. It has waited to make use of its stronger internal dynamics, 
along with a weak international system and United States to take action in returning fiercely in 
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opposition to the international community. Chinese support for Russia was a booster to 
encourage the last to take a stand in support of its Middle Eastern proxies. Nevertheless, this 
would not have increased Russian thrive if the Middle East was not facing a changed political 
order that might pose a threat to Moscow if it does not support allied regimes. This change 
might not be beneficial for Russia after all.  
The next chapters entered into the deep analysis of two case studies; Russian foreign 
policy towards Iran and Syria. In the third chapter, the Russian-Iranian relationship is tackled, 
underlining the Russian consideration in their support to Iran. The chapter demonstrated how 
Iran reveals to be a valuable asset for Moscow; despite its existence as a potential threat, but 
still the economic, religious, and geographical dimensions require Russia to follow a lenient 
supportive stand. In parallel, knowing that the economic gains and security concerns are not 
the main reason behind Russia’s fierce backing of Tehran, Putin is making use of this card to 
exert pressure on the U.S. (weakened international committee and regain its supreme status). 
Similarly, the fourth chapter analyzed the Russian-Syrian foreign policy contending on 
the close links they enjoy., Another link was the strongly preserved relation whereby arms 
sales and energy have played a pivotal role in strengthening the cooperation between them and 
opened new market doors for Moscow. With regard to the geopolitical pillars, the Muslim 
populations and the influx of radical Islamism constitutes a major concern for the Kremlin.  
The current revolutionary state in the Arab region is a potential threat to Russia, which 
required it to meticulously join forces with counter Arab states and also Israel, which 
necessitated a political advocacy. This is where the Palestinian issue falls into context being an 
element that improved Russia’s image in the eyes of the Muslim population. Russia’s policy in 
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the region, whether on the Arab-Israeli conflict or in the Syrian drama reflected an image of 
being an arbitrator in solving crises without the use of force.  
Finally, it is inevitable to wonder why   Russia has waited until the current rise of event 
to act overtly against the international community in support of both actors, Iran and Syria.  
Today, it is evidently impossible to address the current Syrian crisis without tackling the 
Iranian nuclear standoff that has become more contentious. Both issue are interrelated; 
“attacking Iran will require consideration of the reactions of Syria and Hizbullah. Likewise, 
intervention in Syria will have to take into consideration what Iran will do” (Francona, 2012, 
p.4).  
Through comeback to the Middle East, after the long lasting retreat, Russia sought an 
instrumental policy, achieving particular objectives that strengthen and revive its position. 
Political and Economic ambitions have evidently grown. With the above mentioned reenacted 
bilateral relations of the former Soviet allies, whether Arab or non-Arab, Russia was able to 
demonstrate its commitment on the regional dimension.  In a successful attempt to establish a 
political leverage in the region, Putin was able to limit American influence in the Middle East, 
and get hold of bargaining cards to expand its manoeuver power.  Arms sales and energy have 
both played a major role in acquiring a stronger influence and sales promotion of Moscow’s 
arms. In this context, the region constitutes a vital resource for Russian energy supply, as well 
as a dynamic nuclear energy market. On the other hand, Russian policy has been attempting to 
ensure a regularization of its strategy towards the dynamically growing Muslim population; 
North Caucasus in particular. Moscow is attempting to avert the condition of having the 
Russian Federation’s Muslims turn into a radical pan-Islamic concern. Also, as noted in the 
notion of soft power, the regional dedication to the Palestinian issue and the Arab- Israeli peace 
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process  supported the improved Russian image in the eyes of the Arabs in general and the 
Muslim populace in particular. As an intermediary player seeking to find solutions, the 
Kremlin’s purpose is to construct an image of a global power.  Moscow’s return to the region 
as a ‘balancer’, with positive relations leaving no enemies played a vital role in its success to 
advance sustainable influence. It proved that the Middle East features a primary role as a 
leading instrument to attain its revival objective.  
However, despite Moscow’s acting in the Middle East aiming to demonstrate its status 
as a Great Power has not produced any solid product, Russia currently is complicating the 
United States’ goals in the region. Reminiscent of the Soviet Union, and pursuing a pragmatic 
policy that prioritizes stability, Russia is making use of what could be described as a weakened 
international community and US. 
All in all,  
Russia's attachment is to the benefits reaped by having allies, not to the allies 
themselves… Russia’s capacities for further exploitation of the region in order 
to attain the supra- regional objectives of its foreign policy will to a great extent 
depend on the nature of the regimes which replace the current 
dictatorships.(Kaczmarski, 2011) 
 
No matter the result, Russia will not intensely despise changes to submissive regimes, 
as long as its interests within the target countries continue to be unharmed.   
Through comeback to the Middle East, after the long lasting retreat, Russia sought an 
instrumental policy, achieving particular objectives that strengthen and revive its position. 
Political and Economic ambitions have evidently grown. With the above mentioned reenacted 
bilateral relations of the former Soviet allies, whether Arab or non-Arab, Russia was able to 
demonstrate its commitment on the regional dimension.  In a successful attempt to establish a 
political leverage in the region, Putin was able to limit American influence in the Middle East, 
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and get hold of bargaining cards to expand its manoeuver power.  Arms sales and energy have 
both played a major role in acquiring a stronger influence and sales promotion of Moscow’s 
arms. In this context, the region constitutes a vital resource for Russian energy supply, as well 
as a dynamic nuclear energy market. On the other hand, Russian policy has been attempting to 
ensure a regularization of its strategy towards the dynamically growing Muslim population; 
particularly in North Caucasus. Moscow is attempting to avert the condition of having the 
Russian Federation’s Muslims turn into a radical pan-Islamic concern. Also, as noted in the 
notion of soft power, the regional dedication to the Palestinian issue and the Arab- Israeli peace 
process  supported the improved Russian image in the eyes of the Arabs in general and the 
Muslim populace in particular. As an intermediary player seeking to find solutions, the 
Kremlin’s purpose is to construct an image of a global power.  
Moscow’s return to the region as a ‘balancer’ with positive relations leaving no enemies played 
a vital role in its success to advance sustainable influence. It proved that the Middle East 
features a primary role as a leading instrument to attain its revival objective.  
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